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"PRO-LIFE" ABSOLUTES, FEMINIST
CHALLENGES: THE
FUNDAMENTALIST NARRATIVE OF
IRISH ABORTION LAW 1986-1992©
By RUTH FLETCHER*
This article asks how Irish abortion law developed to
the point of stopping a young pregnant rape victim
from travelling abroad to have an abortion in 1992
(Attorney General v. X.). The author argues that this
case, which ultimately saw the Irish Supreme Court
overturn that decision and recognize the young
woman's right to abortion, was the last chapter of the
fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law. The
feminist critique of that law needs to consider its
particular fundamentalist aspects in order to clarify the
obstacles posed to the struggle for Irish women's
reproductive freedom. The author argues that a
fundamentalist narrative ordered the post-colonial and
patriarchal conditions of Irish society so as to call for
the legal recognition of an absolute right to life of the
"unborn." The Supreme Court's interpretation of the
constitutional right to life of the fetus in three cases
during the 1980s is evidence that Irish abortion law was
constructed through a fundamentalist narrative until
that narrative was rejected in the Supreme Court
decision in Attorney General v. X.
Cet article s'interrogesur l'6volution de ]a loi irlandaise
sur I'avortement, emp~chant une jeune victime
d'agression sexuelle de tenter de se faire avorter a
l'exterieur de l'Irlande en 1992 (Attorney General c.X.).
L'auteure soutient que cette d~cision, qui fut par la
suite renvers6e par la Cour supreme d'Irlande afin de
reconnaitre le droit A l'avortement A la victime, fut le
dernier chapitre du discours fondamentaliste du droit
irlandais de I'avortement. La critique f6ministe de ce
droit doit consid6rer ses aspects fondamentalistes afin
de clarifier les obstaclesjuch~s face a la libert6 de choix
des femmes irlandaises. L'auteure soutient que le
discours fondamentaliste est bas6 sur les conditions
post-coloniales et patriarcales de la soci6t, irlandaise,
requ~rant dor~navant la reconnaissance juridique d'un
droit absolu A la vie pour I'enfant A naitre.
L'interpr~tation de la Cour supreme des droits
constitutionnels A la vie du foetus, dans trois decisions
rendues au cours des ann6es quatre-vingts, t~moigne de
I'6volution du droit irlandais de 'avortement A travers
le discours fondamentaliste, jusqu'A ce que celui-ci ait
td rejetd par l'arrEt Attorney General c. X.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In February 1992, a young Irish woman was stopped by the Irish
state from travelling abroad to have an abortion. Pregnant as the result
of rape, this fourteen-year-old girl had expressed the desire to kill herself
rather than continue with the pregnancy. X, as this young woman
became known, decided with her parents that she would travel to
England to terminate the pregnancy. In making this decision, X was
following in the path of thousands of Irish women who travel to England
every year for abortions, there being no provision of abortion services in
Ireland.1 Unlike those thousands of women however, X's intention to
terminate her pregnancy became known to the state authorities. On
notice that an Irish woman was about to have an abortion, the state,
through the attorney general, took immediate steps to prevent the
violation of fetal life.2 The state justified this action by reference to
Article 40(3)(3) of the Irish Constitution which provides: "The State
acknowledges the right to life of the "unborn" and, with due regard to
1 At least five thousand Irish women a year travel to Britain in order to avail themselves of
abortion services there. The U.K. Office for National Statistics reported that 4,884 Irish women had
abortions in England and Wales in 1996, a slight increase from 4,532 women in 1995: see "Abortion
Figures May Not Be Realistic, Says IFPA" The Irish Times (4 June 1997), available on the Internet
at http://www.irish-times.com. Given that Irish women may not give their home addresses when
visiting abortion clinics, and that some will travel to other countries, the official figures are generally
understood to underrepresent the actual number.
2 The Attorney General v. X. and Others, [1992] 1 I.R. 1 [hereinafterX].
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the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect,
and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right."3
Suddenly the only thing that was important about X was that she
was about to terminate her pregnancy. The fact that X had rejected the
pregnancy, the fact that she was pregnant due to rape, and the fact that
she would be further violated if forced to carry the pregnancy to term, all
became insignificant details in the face of the possibility that an abortion
would be performed. The attorney general moved to prevent the
procuring of an abortion by seeking an injunction preventing this girl
and her parents from leaving the country during the nine months of her
pregnancy. On 17 February, the High Court granted the injunction on
the grounds that the risk that the young pregnant woman would die if
the injunction was granted was lesser than the risk that the "unborn"
would die if the injunction was not granted. Nine days later, under
extreme public pressure, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court
decision and X was permitted to travel to England to terminate her
pregnancy. A four to one majority of the Court held that the injunction
against X should be lifted since she had a right to an abortion, given that
her threat of suicide posed a real and substantial risk to her life.4
In this article, I am primarily interested in trying to explain how
the Irish legal system could produce such an extreme case. It is
problematic enough from a feminist perspective that the Irish state
denies women access to abortion services within their own country so
that X was unable to have an abortion in Ireland.5 But in this instance
the state did more than just ignore its responsibility to address the
reproductive needs of Irish women: it actively set out to prevent one of
its citizens from alleviating her own suffering by stopping her from
travelling abroad to get an abortion. I am interested in teasing out the
explanation for this particular legal development as a specific aspect of
the history of Irish abortion law. Why did the attorney general of a
3 In 1983, the Eighth Amendment was adopted by referendum and Article 40(3)(3) was
incorporated into the Irish Constitution (Bunreacht Na hEireann), 1937. See A. Barron, "This
Amendment Could Kill Women" (1984) 7 Harv. Women's L.J. 287; and B. Girvin, "Social Change
and Moral Politics: The Irish Constitutional Referendum 1983" (1986) 34 Pol. Stud. 61.
4 See J. ingston & A. Whelan, with I. Bacik, Abortion and the Law (Dublin: Roundhall Sweet
and Maxwell Press, 1997) for a review of Irish abortion law. See also N. Whitty, "Law and the
Regulation of Reproduction in Ireland: 1922-1992" (1993) 43 U.T.L.J. 851.
5 E. Mahon and C. Conlon adopt standard methods of statistical calculation to show that, in
1994, the rate was 5.8 abortions per 1,000 women aged between 15 and 44: see "Legal Abortions
Carried Out in England on Women Normally Resident in the Republic of Ireland" in Government
of Ireland, Constitution Review Group, Report of the Constitution Review Group (Dublin: Stationery
Office, 1996), Appendix 21 [hereinafter Constitution Review Group].
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liberal democratic state perceive himself as legally obliged to seek an
injunction stopping X from travelling for an abortion? How did the
value of fetal life become legally recognized as a superior value in Irish
society? These particular questions need to be answered in accounting
for the production of the X case. If we trace the socio-legal process
which produced the X case, we will develop a clearer picture of the
complexities of Irish abortion law.
Events which have taken place since the X case also indicate that
the time is ripe for Irish feminism to assess the various dimensions of
abortion law. In November 1997, the High Court denied the parents of
a thirteen-year-old girl their request to quash an order given by a lower
court that allowed their daughter to travel to England for an abortion
under the care of the state.6 The young woman, a member of the
travelling community,7 was pregnant due to rape and had been taken
into the care of the state shortly after it was discovered that she had been
raped by a friend of the family. Although her parents were initially
supportive of her wish to terminate the pregnancy, they changed their
minds after members of anti-choice organizations such as Youth
Defence approached them. As a result the Eastern Health Board,
within whose care the girl had been placed, applied to the District Court
to extend the care order under the Child Care Act 1991,8 so that it could
bring C, the young woman in question, abroad to obtain a termination of
her pregnancy. When the District Court granted that order, the parents
applied to the High Court for judicial review, on several grounds,
including that abortion could not constitute a medical treatment under
the Act given the constitutional right to life of the fetus. Funding for the
legal action was organized by anti-choice organizations. The High Court
refused to quash the order primarily because Mr. Justice Geoghegan
found that an abortion which came within the terms of the X case, as in
this instance, was a medical treatment under the Act. Plans for an
appeal to the Supreme Court were eventually abandoned and C was
permitted to travel for an abortion.9 In the wake of this case the
6 See A. and B. v. Eastern Health Board, Fahy and C. (28 November 1997), (H.C.)
[unreported], [hereinafter C]: see The Irish Times (29 November 1997), available on the Internet at
http://www.irish-times.com.
7 The Irish travelling community, or "travellers," are a distinct ethnic group in Irish society
who have historically led a nomadic lifestyle. See further J. Mac Laughlin, Travellers and Ireland.-
Whose Country, Whose History? (Cork: Cork University Press, 1995).
8 Acts of the Oireachtas (Ireland) 1991, No. 17.
9 C. Newman, "Rape Victim Free to Have Abortion in England" The Irish Tines (2 December
1997), available on the Internet at http://www.irish-times.com.
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government has finally begun a process which will hopefully culminate in
the introduction of abortion legislation. An interdepartmental working
group on abortion has been appointed and is expected to publish a green
paper discussion document in the summer of 1998.1 0 These
developments indicate that Irish abortion law is engaged in a process of
change. In this article, I suggest that, in order to comprehend and make
the most of that change, we need to relate it to the shifts that have
occurred in abortion law since the fetal right to life was constitutionally
recognized.
I argue that the X case was produced by the Irish legal system's
endorsement of a fundamentalist view of the value of fetal life. The
courts adopted an absolutist approach to the interpretation of Article
40(3)(3) when it first arose for their consideration, an approach that I
suggest led to the High Court decision to grant the injunction in the X
case. In three cases during the late 1980s 1l the Irish superior courts
chose to interpret the constitutionally endorsed fetal right to life as if it
had absolute value. In finding that the duty to protect the fetal right to
life justified limiting the distribution of information about abortion
services abroad, the courts interpreted the fetal right to life as if it was a
more important interest than women's constitutional rights; as if
everyone was obliged to observe this right in the same way despite their
different circumstances; and as if the fetal right to life required people to
behave in a way that would avoid the possibility, rather than the
actuality, of its violation. The adoption of this absolutist interpretation
of the fetal right to life was not justified by doctrinal legal rules. It was
possible for the courts to have adopted alternative interpretations of the
way to accommodate the fetal right to life and women's constitutional
rights. Their adoption of an absolutist interpretation therefore requires
an explanation, an explanation which I provide in terms of a
fundamentalist narrative.
Further evidence of the courts' adoption of a fundamentalist
interpretation of the fetal right to life is provided by their decision to
10 M.M. Tynan, "June Deadline For Drafting of Abortion Green Paper" The Irish Times (3
December 1997), available on the Internet at http://www.irish-times.com.
11 One dispute concerned the provision of abortion information by pregnancy counselling
centres in: Attorney General (at the Relation of the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children
Ireland Ltd.) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Wellwoman Centre Ltd., [1988] I.R. 593
(H.C.), aff'd [1988] I.R. 619 (S.C.) [hereinafter Open Door]. The other dispute concerned student
unions' provision of abortion information in two cases: Society for the Protection of Unborn Children
(Ireland) Ltd v. Coogan and Others, [1989] I.R. 734 (H.C.), rev'd [1989] I.R. 738 (S.C.) [hereinafter
Coogan]; and Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan and Others,
[1989] I.R. 753 (H.C.), rev'd [1989] I.R. 760 (S.C.) [hereinafter Grogan].
19981
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
permit a fundamentalist group to act as the legal guardian of the public
interest in protecting fetal life. The Supreme Court permitted the
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (sPuc) to police the
constitutional right to life of the fetus in granting that organization
standing to bring an injunction against student unions prohibiting them
from distributing abortion information. 12 In so doing the Court
conflated the public interest in the protection of fetal life with the
private interest of a fundamentalist group that sought to impose their
will on all Irish women by stopping them from having abortions. The
Court allowed law to become an instrument for achieving
fundamentalist goals.
Additonally, the Irish judiciary, with the noteworthy exception of
Ms. Justice Carroll13 in the High Court, constructed the issue of the fetal
right to life in such a way as to deny Irish citizens their rights under
European Community (EC) 1 4 law. The Supreme Court implicitly
criticized, but could not overturn, Carroll J.'s decision to refer questions
on the issue of the distribution of abortion information to the European
Court of Justice (ECJ).15 The Court interpreted the issue of abortion
regulation as a matter of peculiarly Irish national import in order to
reject the argument that the injunction against the student unions was
not lawful under EC law if there was a right to distribute information
about services lawfully provided in other member states. This effort to
isolate abortion law from the application of EC law also indicates a
fundamentalist concern with preventing international forces from
challenging their power to regulate domestic affairs. By adopting an
absolutist, isolationist approach and by allowing a fundamentalist group
to police a constitutional right, the Irish courts gave legal authority to a
fundamentalist view of the value of fetal life.
In order to explain how the courts came to this interpretation of
the fetal right to life between 1986 and 1992, I will first clarify the
concept of fundamentalism which I use to express the relationship
between the legal outcome of these cases and the social context in which
they occurred. I adopt the concept of narrative as a means of
12 Coogan, supra note 11.
13 The convention in Ireland is to refer to women judges as if they were married women
whether or not they actually are married, but Ms. Justice Mella Carroll prefers not to be addressed
as a married woman.
14 Before the 1992 Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, O.J. 1993, C224/I [hereinafter
Maastricht Treaty], what is now known as the European Union (EU) was known as the European
Community (Ec), hence I adopt the latter term in this article.
15 Grogan, supra note 11.
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articulating how abortion law became implicated in the fundamentalist
story which tells us that the absolute protection of fetal life is necessary
in order to combat the threat to Roman Catholicism's power to regulate
sexuality and reproduction; a threat that was posed by the law's adoption
of a stance at odds with Roman Catholic doctrine in a contraception
case.1 6 I make use of the concept of ideology in order to show how
fundamentalism represents post-colonial and patriarchal Ireland in such
a way as to justify its demand for the absolute protection of fetal life;
representations which the fundamentalist narrative makes
comprehensible by organizing them into a story that we can understand.
Once we comprehend how fundamentalism works in Irish society, we
can begin to have a clearer understanding of how and why a
fundamentalist view of the value of fetal life was translated into law
through the process of judicial interpretation in the abortion information
cases.
When the fundamentalist narrative assumed legal authority and
became a legal narrative as well as a social narrative, the legal conditions
were created that would give rise to the X case. By providing an
absolutist interpretation of the fetal right to life the courts wrote the
penultimate chapter of the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion
law. By bringing "pro-life" absolutism to a climax, and thus exposing the
actual consequences of legal endorsement of a fundamentalist narrative
for women's lives, the X case also brought that legal narrative to a close
and stripped fundamentalism of legal authority. The negative public
reaction to the High Court decision provoked the Supreme Court to
overturn it and abandon its past practice of absolutely protecting the
fetal right to life by recognizing a limited right to abortion. The X case
revealed in concrete terms the implications of having a fundamentalist
narrative as the ruling interpretation of Irish abortion law. Once those
implications were recognized the Irish people and the Irish courts
rejected the fundamentalist narrative as the appropriate interpretation
of abortion law, leaving the way open for alternative narratives to
assume legal authority. The tragedy was that it took the persecution of a
particular young woman to persuade people to reject a legal policy of
absolute protection of fetal life. Although pro-choicers and feminists
had worked hard through the 1980s to protest the effects of a
fundamentalist abortion law, they had not succeeded in getting enough
popular support to overturn this law. The triumph of the X case is that
the fundamentalist interpretation of the value of fetal life was
16 McGee v. Attorney General and the Revenue Commissioners, [1974 I.R. 284 (S.C.)
[hereinafter McGee].
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abandoned by the Supreme Court. In order to make the most of this
opportunity it is appropriate that Irish feminism critique the socio-legal
process that brought us to this point. Before going on to explain how
fundamentalism worked in Irish society to produce an absolutist legal
interpretation of the fetal right to life, I will outline the premises of my
feminist critique of this process.
II. FEMINIST CRITIQUE
In approaching Irish abortion law from a feminist perspective
there are two layers to the problem it poses for Irish women. At a
general level, feminism needs to describe and criticize the harm that is
done to women through the legal denial of access to abortion, a harm
that has notmative and empirical implications for women's lives. At a
particular level, feminism needs to identify and analyze the different
ways in which that legal denial is articulated in order to be able to
challenge it. For example, post-X abortion law denies Irish women
equitable access to abortion by limiting abortion access to an exceptional
category of women, those whose lives are in danger. But pre-X abortion
law denied that any woman could be legally permitted to have an
abortion by interpreting the distribution of abortion information as an
unjustifiable infringement of the fetal right to life. Therefore, my
critique of Irish abortion law between 1986 and 1992 is informed by the
general premise that law treats women unjustly and unequally when it
denies them access to abortion, and by the particular premise that
feminism needs to understand the specific way in which a fundamentalist
legal interpretation of the fetal right to life does injustice to women. As
this article is chiefly concerned with elaborating on the latter premise,
the reasons for a general feminist critique of Irish abortion law require a
brief explanation.
Rosalind Petchesky has argued that there are two main reasons
why the denial of reproductive freedom, which includes abortion access,
is problematic for women.1 7 First, the demand for women's
17 R.P. Petchesky, Abortion and Woman's Choice: The State, Sexuality and Reproductive
Freedom, rev. ed. (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990). See also: J. Brodie, S. Gavigan &
J. Jenson, The Politics of Abortion (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992); D. Cornell, The
Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography and Sexual Harassment (New York: Routledge, 1995);
M.G. Fried, ed., From Abortion to Reproductive Freedom: Transforming a Movement (Boston: South
End Press, 1990); L. Shrage, Moral Dilemmas of Feminism: Prostitution, Adultery, and Abortion (New
York: Routledge, 1994); S. Sheldon, Beyond Control: Medical Power and Abortion Law (London:
Pluto Press, 1997); and A. Smyth, ed., TheAbortion Papers - Ireland (Dublin: Attic Press, 1992).
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reproductive freedom arises from the argument that the interest in
recognizing a person's bodily integrity or bodily self-determination
means that women ought to be able to control their bodies and their
reproductive capacities. "As long as women's bodies remain the
medium for pregnancies, the connection between women's reproductive
freedom and control over their bodies represents not only a moral and
political claim but also, on some level, a material necessity." 18 A
feminism that understands women as socially mediated individuals (i.e.,
as human beings who are historically determined and socially
constructed and who have concrete and particular needs) identifies
women's interest in bodily integrity and reproductive freedom as a need
that emerges when women's control over their bodies is denied; it does
not have absolute status.
Second, the feminist argument for women's reproductive
freedom derives from the acknowledgment of women's social position,
rather than from their individual interests. Given that women are the
most affected by pregnancy under a social division of labour which gives
women primary responsibility for child care, women should be the ones
who decide whether or not to have children.1 9 Therefore, when Irish law
robs women of reproductive decisionmaking authority by recognizing a
fetal right to life and denying them access to free and safe abortion
services in their own country, it has the normative consequences of
denying women's bodily integrity and control, and of tying them to the
materially and symbolically undervalued social role of motherhood.
The empirical research on Irish women's use of abortion services
suggests that the lack of such services in Ireland contributes to Irish
women's presentation for abortion later in their pregnancies, and
therefore negatively affects women's health.20 The relatively high rate of
young single mothers indicates both that Irish women are experiencing
difficulty in exercising fertility control, and that young women perceive
motherhood as one of the ways open to them of achieving some status in
18 Petchesky, supra note 17 at 5.
19 See A. Jaggar, "Abortion and a Woman's Right to Decide" in C.C. Gould & M.W.
Wartofsky, eds., Women and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation (New York: Putnam, 1976).
20 See C. Conlon, The Reality of Abortion for Irish Women: An Analysis of the Pregnancy
Counselling Service Offered by the Irish Family Planning Association, (M.A. Thesis, Women's Studies,
University College, Dublin, Ireland, 1994) [unpublished]. See also the recently published
Department of Health commissioned study: E. Mahon, C. Conlon & L. Dillon, Women and Crisis
Pregnancy (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1998).
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Irish society.21 The lack of easily accessible abortion and reproductive
services has contributed to this situation. Obviously the X case and the
C case are themselves evidence of the harmful effects of Irish abortion
policy on these two particular young women. Both of these women had
their terminations delayed by legal procedures concerning the
application of Article 40(3)(3), and suffered the intrusion of the media
into an intimate and difficult time in their personal lives.22 Pregnancy
counselling services in Ireland and in England have repeatedly expressed
concern about the lack of support for Irish women, who often travel
alone and in secret to England in order to terminate their pregnancies,
and who receive little or no after-care following their return to Ireland.2 3
Although the legalization of abortion information in 199524 has lifted the
stigma somewhat from those who avail of and those who provide
information about abortion services, the fact that Irish women have to
travel abroad in order to have an abortion imposes added expense and
inconvenience and makes what is already a difficult experience for some
women even more cumbersome.25
The feminist struggle for Irish women's reproductive freedom,
particularly for access to abortion, arises with the identification and
description of a problem for Irish women in the legal regulation of the
fetal right to life, the critique of the processes which brought about the
problem, and the prescription of how that problem should be resolved.
21 See J. Murphy-Lawless, "Fertility, Bodies and Politics: The Irish Case" (1993) 2
Reproductive Health Materials 72. In 1992, 12.6 per cent of all single women who gave birth were
under twenty years of age, and eighteen per cent of all births were to unmarried women, at 85,
footnote 6.
22 The manner in which women's and girls' lives are differentially impacted by such social
forces as poverty and racism became obvious when the Irish press adopted a more intrusive
approach to C's story. While details of X's domestic circumstances were kept quiet, photographs of
C's family caravan were published in daily newspapers. The fact that C was a traveller and a
member of a poor family rendered her more vulnerable to public scrutiny.
23 See R. Riddick, The IFPA Pregnancy Counselling Service: Profile Report - The First 100
Clients (Dublin: Irish Family Planning Association, 1993). See also S. Burke, Profile of the First 202
Women to Attend Open Door Counselling July to September (Dublin: Open Door Counselling, 1983);
G. Dean, Termination of Pregnancy, England 1983: Women from the Republic of Ireland (Dublin:
Medico-Social Research Board, 1984); G. Dean et. al., Termination of Pregnancy, England 1984:
Women from the Republic of Ireland (Dublin: Medico-Social Research Board, 1985); and C.
Francome, If You Ever Go Across the Sea to England: A Study of 200 Irish Women Travelling to
England for TheirAbortions (Enfield, Middlesex: Health Research Centre, 1991).
24 Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act
1995, Acts of the Oireachtas (Ireland) 1995, No. 8.
25 See T. Caherty, Choosing to Tell - Women's Accounts of the Experience of Abortion (M.Phil.
Thesis, Women Studies, Trinity College, Dublin, 1993) [unpublished]; and R. Fletcher, "Silences:
Irish Women and Abortion" (1995) 50 Feminist Rev. 44.
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Each of these elements---description, critique, and prescription-has an
analytically distinct, if actually intertwined, role to play in this struggle
for Irish women's reproductive freedom. To respond to the call of one
does not necessarily entail the denial of the significance of the other.
Rather, strategies that are prescribed for the resolution of a particular
problem in specific social, historical, and geographical conditions
without having adequately described and criticized the evolution of the
problem risk missing their mark. I locate my effort to illuminate the
legal process by which the X case was produced within the enterprise of
critique.26 I criticize abortion law in order to unearth the interpretations
that inform it as part of the feminist task of evaluating the ways in which
law limits pro-choice practice in Ireland. Criticizing the judicial
interpretation of the fetal right to life in the abortion information cases
means asking what were the norms that led the judges to their legal
conclusions. One looks at what the courts said, and sometimes at what
they did not say, in order to uncover their understanding of fetal rights
and women's rights, and their interpretation of the relationship between
them. Through this process of critique, I clarify the relationship between
Irish abortion law and fundamentalist social practice at a particular
point in Irish history. Before going on to do this however, I first need to
clarify my understanding of fundamentalism and how it works in Irish
society.
A. The Concept of Fundamentalism
In my view, fundamentalisms are political movements which rely
on religion to justify their quest to have the absolute authority of their
principles recognized. Fundamentalisms are not simply a sort of
religion, since they are characterized more by their particular approach
to and use of religion than by the fact of a religious connection.
Fundamentalisms may be distinguished from traditional, conservative or
orthodox religious movements by their adherence to an absolutist
philosophy. This is why the Amish, for example, are not considered to
be fundamentalist. 27 The Amish observe a traditional, conservative
26 1 follow Max Horkheimer, critical social theorist and member of the Institute for Social
Research, Frankfurt, in believing that the struggle against human suffering and social injustice is the
goal which drives critical theory. See his Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. M.J. O'Connell et.
al. (New York: Continuum Publishing, 1992) c. 6, entitled, "Traditional and Critical Theory."
271 take this point from the sociologists of fundamentalisms, M.E. Marty & R.S. Appleby, The
Glory and the Power The Fundamentalist Challenge to the Modem World (Boston: Beacon Press,
1992) c.1, entitled, "The Fundamentals of Fundamentalism."
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lifestyle informed by their religious beliefs, but they do not attempt to
create a situation where others must observe and live by the Amish
creed.
Similarly, it is not enough to say that fundamentalisms are
political movements since there are other kinds of political mobilizations
of religion that we do not normally consider fundamentalist. 28
Revealing the politics of fundamentalisms is an important part of
critiquing their effort to remove social issues from the human world to
the realm of the divine. But the fact that fundamentalisms are political
does not in itself tell us much about the particular nature of
fundamentalisms as political movements. The organization Catholics for
a Free Choice, for example, uses its interpretation of Roman Catholic
teachings to argue for a woman's right to choose.2 9 Yet they are
certainly not described as fundamentalist. I think that absolutism is the
defining characteristic of fundamentalisms; it is absolutism that makes
political-religious movements fundamentalist rather than merely
conservative. The adherence to absolutism provides a general
explanation for fundamentalism in allowing us to distinguish it from
other sorts of social phenomena.
There are three ways in which fundamentalisms may be
absolutist: (1) by insisting that their values have absolute weight in all
contexts; (2) by imposing positive rather than negative obligations on
others; and (3) by subjecting everyone, even non-believers, to their
principles. Fundamentalisms insist that social dilemmas of all kinds
should be resolved by public acceptance of their moral values, whatever
the particular interests raised. They further insist that everyone, not just
members of their own community, should act on their principles rather
than simply avoid offending against them.
The extent to which fundamentalisms are overt about using
religion as the justification for their stance will depend on the
dominance of secularism in the particular society in which a
fundamentalism operates. Since fundamentalisms want first and
foremost to convince their audience that their values should be
observed, they are likely to adopt a mode of argumentation that will
resonate with that audience. It is common therefore for
fundamentalisms to be strategic in framing their arguments in the
28 See C. Connolly, "Washing Our Linen: One Year of Women Against Fundamentalism"
(1991) 37 Feminist Rev. 68, where she identifies fundamentalism, at 69, as "the mobilization of
religious affiliation for political ends."
29 See, for example, their pamphlet: M.R. Maguire & D.C. Maguire, Abortion: A Guide to
Making Ethical Choices (Washington: Catholics for a Free Choice, 1983).
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language of human rights and science, to name two examples of
dominant discourses, in order to gain popular support. Steve Bruce
comments with regard to the American New Christian Right:
[T]he virtues of fundamentalism are presented, not as divine injunctions, but as socially
functional arrangements. It is also a matter of conceding crucial ground to the pluralism
of the modern world by accepting the need to separate religious values and sociomoral
positions so that alliances can be formed with advocates of competing social values.30
In the context of abortion, fundamentalist groups tend to rely on
scientific discourse in referring to the fetus's genetic makeup, for
example, as evidence of its membership in humanity. They will invoke
the language of human rights to argue that abortion is unjustifiable
because the fetus has a right to life. In this way the reliance on religion
may be obscured and one needs to read between the lines in order to
find it. Evidence of a reliance on religion usually becomes more obvious
when one considers the rationale for the fundamentalist stance that fetal
life should never be interfered with. The view that there are never any
circumstances in which biological human life can be legitimately ended
regards the value of life as its god-given quality. The fact that
fundamentalisms use secular discourses is evidence therefore of their
emergence from and engagement with a world in which secularism is a
potent force.31 It merely shows how fundamentalisms are strategic in
using secularism against itself. For example, Dr. Mary Lucey,
chairperson of sPuc commented during the Pro-Life Amendment
Campaign:
We are trying with all our might and power to give protection to every child from the first
moment of conception .... Every new life is a miracle of the Lord of creation ... . To
those who say there is nothing there at the moment of conception the answer is that this
is not true. There is a new human person whose heart is beating even before the mother
knows she is pregnant. To those who say there is nothing only a blob of jelly or a piece of
matter from the first moment: there is a separate human being living within the womb,
dependent on the mother but not part of her. This can all be medically demonstrated
and proven. That being true, is it not obvious that the unborn person has a right to
life? 32
30 "Revelations: The Future of the New Christian Right" in L. Kaplan, ed., Fundamentalism in
Comparative Perspective (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992) 38 at 65.
31 For an insightful discussion of the ways in which secular concepts such as equality and rights
may be used in fundamentalist discourses, see R. Kapur & B. Cossman, Subversive Sites: Feminist
Engagements with Law in India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996) c. 4, entitled, "Women, the
Hindu Right and Legal Discourse."
32 Cited in T. Hesketh, The Second Partitioning of Ireland - The Abortion Referendum of 1983
(Dublin: Brandsma Books, 1990) at 48.
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The term fundamentalism carries such pejorative connotations in
popular discourse that the description of a movement as fundamentalist
is assumed, too often, to be sufficient in itself as a critique. This
situation is problematic for the study of fundamentalisms and their social
significance in several ways. When the description of an object of
inquiry as "fundamentalist" is enough to condemn that object with little
or no explanation, then the use of that description may function to stifle
critical analysis of fundamentalisms rather than to encourage it. If there
is good reason to criticize a fundamentalism on the grounds of its
political and social consequences, then such criticism is ill served by the
assumption, rather than the explanation, of a pejorative attitude to
fundamentalisms. Without an account of the reasons for criticizing
fundamentalisms, the label "fundamentalist" can all too easily become a
means to criticize social movements without accounting for or taking
responsibility for that criticism. In this way, the use of the term
fundamentalism can come to serve as a mask for racism. 33 A movement
that may potentially be criticized for its absolutism may be actually
criticized on the basis of cultural, racial, or ethnic difference, and the
racism of this stance is obscured by claiming the legitimacy of an anti-
fundamentalist position. In order for it to be possible to criticize
particular movements without reproducing racist stereotypes, we must at
least first attempt to clarify the objectives of our critique.
Feminists criticize fundamentalists because the latter's emphasis
on the need for absolute observance of their principles makes them
intolerant of moral, political and social views other than their own. This
intolerance is particularly problematic given that fundamentalists
actively seek public endorsement of their principles. Fundamentalists do
not only disagree with viewpoints other than their own, they see the
existence of moral diversity as part of the problem and seek to quash it.
Feminists criticize this intolerance because it stifles participation in
substantive debate on the accommodation of personal and public values,
and makes it more difficult for the historically and socially marginalized
to be heard. The fundamentalist construction of an ideal community
that is homogenous in its adherence to particular cultural values, in this
case "pro-life" values, denies the significance of cultural heterogeneity,
such as the actual abortion practice of Irish women or the pro-choice
politics of Irish groups and individuals, and contributes to its
33 See S. Harding, "Representing Fundamentalism: The Problem of the Repugnant Cultural
Other" (1991) 58 Soc. Res. 373.
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marginalization 3 4 Feminists also criticize fundamentalists for claiming
to represent the best interests of their community without addressing the
desires or needs of women members of that community on an equal
basis. Fundamentalists will publicly advocate and privately adopt
practices that have direct effects on women's lives as if the resulting
constraints on women were insignificant concerns. Irish society's
adherence to "pro-life" values is advocated and celebrated as a means of
saving Irish culture from the damage which abortion allegedly does to
society and to women without acknowledging the damage that a "pro-
life" culture has done.3S
Another way in which fundamentalists are problematic from a
feminist perspective is in their characterization of social problems. For
example, feminists disagree with the fundamentalist representation of
sexual promiscuity as the cause of unplanned pregnancies and abortions,
and of sexual abstinence as the solution 3 6 If sexual practice is a positive
aspect of human lives, something that is to be cherished and enjoyed,
even if it can also be a site of danger and exploitation,37 a general policy
of sexual abstinence denies people the opportunity to explore a rich
source of potential pleasure and happiness in their lives. It is only if one
understands sexual practice as a mechanical function of biological
reproduction that it makes sense to deny that sexual practice can play a
multiplicity of positive roles in people's lives. A feminism that denies
that sex has to be tied to reproduction does not identify sexual
promiscuity as a problem in itself, or sexual abstinence as a possible
34 See generally D. Kandiyoti, ed., Women, Islam and the State (London: Macmillan, 1991) at
78. See also K.M. Brown, "Fundamentalism and the Control of Women" in J.S. Hawley, ed.,
Fundamentalism and Gender (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 175.
35 Irish feminism is particularly haunted by the stories of two women who lost their lives as
members of a society whose obsessive pro-natalism compromised their ability to deal with their
pregnancies. In March 1983, Sheila Hodgers died two days after giving birth to her baby. The baby
had died shortly after birth. Hodgers, already a mother of two children, died after being refused
treatment for her cancer and after her request for an early induced delivery or caesarean section
was denied. The hospital she attended in Drogheda refused her an X-ray, painkillers, and medical
treatment because its ethical code would not permit treatment which would damage the fetus: see
E. O'Reilly, Masterminds of the Right (Dublin: Attic Press, 1992) at 7-9. In January 1984, fifteen-
year-old Anne Lovett died giving birth in a Grotto just outside the small town of Granard where she
lived. After nine months of trying to conceal her pregnancy, Anne had gone to this secluded spot, a
Grotto that celebrates the virgin birth of Christ, to give birth to a baby who died hours before its
mother: see N. McCafferty, "The Death of Ann Lovett" in Smyth, ed., supra note 17, 99.
36 See F. Ginsburg, "The Body Politic: The Defence of Sexual Restriction by Anti-Abortion
Activists" in C.S. Vance, ed., Pleasure and Danger. Exploring Female Sexuality (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1984) 173.
37 See further C.S. Vance, "Pleasure and Danger: Toward a Politics of Sexuality" in Vance,
ed., supra note 36 at 1.
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solution. To the extent that unplanned pregnancies are a problem for
women, they are a problem because of the lack of socio-economic
support for mothers and because of the lack of fertility control. From a
feminist perspective, the solutions to these problems are the provision of
a range of socio-economic supports for mothers, and of free and safe
fertility control methods, as well as education about sex and fertility
control. The advocation of sexual abstinence as the solution to the issue
of abortion only serves to stigmatize sexual practice and make it more
difficult for young people and sexual minorities in particular to develop
healthy and responsible sexual lives.
Revealing the reasons for a critical approach to fundamentalisms
also facilitates the task of analyzing the particular nature of
fundamentalisms and the social conditions which produce them. This
latter task is an important aspect of the study of fundamentalisms
because it is by focusing on these types of issues that we come to
understand what the presence of fundamentalism has to tell us about the
social relations of which it is a part. In this sense, fundamentalism is as
much a category of analysis as it is an object of inquiry. Therefore, in
arguing that a particular historical period (1986-92) in Irish abortion law
should be recognized as being informed by a fundamentalist view of fetal
life, my intention is not simply to criticize this development-although
that is part of my project-but to draw attention to the features of Irish
abortion law and its social context that are brought into focus by the
recognition of this fundamentalism. I make the claim that the
movement that sought to constitutionalize, and later to enforce, the fetal
right to life in Ireland was a fundamentalist movement. I suggest that
the identification of this phenomenon as fundamentalist has three
principal consequences for our analysis of the socio-legal regulation of
abortion in Ireland. It serves to clarify the significance of particular
historical changes in Irish abortion law; to distinguish the fundamentalist
legal mobilization of Roman Catholicism in the 1980s from a similar
nationalist mobilization in the 1920s and 1930s; and to explain the
particular relationship between the external social conditions of Irish
abortion law and the internal doctrinal dimensions of that law.
It is also worth noting that the relevant literature on
fundamentalisms rarely refers to movements in the Republic of
Ireland.3 8 While the dominance of Roman Catholicism in Ireland is
38 A comprehensive survey of the international literature on fundamentalisms revealed that
the anti-abortion, or general "pro-family values," activities of Roman Catholic groups in the
Republic of Ireland have not been discussed as an example of fundamentalism. See, for example,
the volumes of the Fundamentalist Project, volume 1 of which is: M.E. Marty and R.S. Appleby,
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commonly referred to as part of the explanation for the strength of anti-
divorce, anti-gay, and anti-abortion activism over the years, it is unusual
to find any of these issues studied in the particular terms of
fundamentalism.3 9 By explicitly approaching the issue of abortion and
its legal regulation in order to reveal its fundamentalist aspects, I mean
to distance myself from the view that Ireland's conservative Catholic
status is in itself a sufficient explanation for phenomena such as the
policy of absolutist legal protection of fetal life. The presence of
fundamentalism in Irish society indicates a moral diversity that is
obscured by the assumption of homogeneity in such references to
"Catholic Ireland." Fundamentalism, as a particular type of movement
that adopts moral absolutes, and as a reaction to trends of secularization
and pluralism, points to the need to ask how Catholicism is put to work
in Ireland, rather than to assume its force as an explanation of social
phenomena. In adopting fundamentalism as an analytical category, I
also seek to illustrate that there are a range of moral and social
perspectives on abortion in Irish society, even if abortion law does not
reflect this diversity. The fundamentalist approach to abortion is one
such perspective; the feminist, liberal, socialist, or pluralist approaches
that fundamentalism rails against are others. The fundamentalist view
of abortion is also to be distinguished from other conservative
perspectives that argue against the legalization of abortion as a matter of
principle, but which tolerate exceptions to the rule in a manner which an
absolutist prioritization of the value of fetal life does not permit. In the
aftermath of the X case, Irish abortion law has adopted a conservative
stance on abortion which recognizes a right to abortion only in
circumstances where the pregnant woman's life is in danger. By
examining the process by which fundamentalism became the dominant
mode of interpretation of Irish abortion law prior to the X case, we
reveal the particular significance of that interpretation.
III. FUNDAMENTALISM IN IRISH SOCIETY
Having clarified my understanding of fundamentalism, I want to
suggest a theoretical framework that allows us to think of
fundamentalism as having a particular structure, and to assess the ways
eds., Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
39 Notable exceptions to this rule are: A. Rossiter, "'Between the Devil and the Deep Blue
Sea': Irish Women, Catholicism and Colonialism" in G. Sahgal & N. Yuval-Davis, eds., Refusing
Holy Orders: Women and Fundamentalism in Britain (London: Virago, 1992) 69; and Connolly, supra
note 28.
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in which that structure gives meaning to the social relations of which it is
a part, while also acknowledging that fundamentalism is marked by the
social relations from which it emerges. I draw on Hayden White's
concept of narrative4 0 in suggesting that if we understand
fundamentalism as a narrative, we can identify it as having a specific
form, and account for the ways in which that form gives a series of events
particular meaning by organizing them into a story which can be read.
In this sense, narrative is both the structure that produces the story and
the end product of that structuring process: the story itself. Narrative is
a form of discourse in the Foucauldian sense; it is a meaning-producing
system. White's particular concern is with the connection between the
reading of history and genres of literary figuration. He comments: "In
historical discourse, the narrative serves to transform into a story a list of
historical events that would otherwise be only a chronicle." 4' Since we
come to know historical events through their symbolic representation,
narrative as the mode of that symbolic representation produces the
meaning of those events by organizing them into a recognizable genre.
If we read White's point at an abstract level, as suggesting that the
structure of narrative produces the meaning of those elements of the
narrative which it arranges, then I see no reason to deny the application
of narrative to a political movement that interprets events as it organizes
them according to a fundamentalist principle.42
I suggest that the story that a fundamentalist narrative weaves
may be identified by the following features: (1) fundamentalism thinks of
itself as a "pure," uncompromising form of its religion; (2)
fundamentalism regards secularization as a threat to society and reacts
against this perceived threat; (3) fundamentalism asserts the absolute
authority of its interpretation of religious values; and (4)
fundamentalism is threatened by its own culture's tolerance of non-
fundamentalist values which it construes as foreign. In the particular
context of Irish abortion law, the fundamentalist story plays out as a
40 H. White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1987).
41 IbiL at 43.
42 See K. Abrams, "The Narrative and the Normative in Legal Scholarship" in S.S.
Heinzelman & Z.B. Wiseman, eds., Representing Women: Law, Literature and Feminism (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994) 44, for a discussion of some of the ways in which the concept of
narrative has been used in feminist legal studies. See also B.S. Jackson, Law, Fact and Narrative
Coherence (Merseyside, U.K.: Deborah Charles Publications, 1988). Jackson draws on the concept
of narrative as understood in Greimasian semiotics to argue that in the legal process of applying law
to fact, both law and fact are informed by narratives (law implicitly, fact explicitly) so that the
conclusion arrived at is a matter of coherence rather than correspondence to legal truth.
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campaign to constitutionalize and legally enforce the absolute value of
fetal life. Irish fundamentalism interpreted Roman Catholic doctrine on
the value of fetal life to argue that abortion was never justifiable.43
Fundamentalists perceived the Irish legal system's acceptance of the
validity of the use of artificial contraception, and the possibility that
Ireland might follow the path of other European and North American
states in liberalizing access to abortion, as a threat to Roman
Catholicism's power to mark national identity. As Emily 0' Reilly
comments:
The extent to which the McGee decision acted as a rallying cry for catholic lay
fundamentalists was noted by SPUC president Dr. Mary Lucey addressing an anti-
abortion gathering some time after the 1983 abortion referendum. She said: "... we had
thought that Ireland would be different-we had the 1861 Anti-Abortion Act. The vast
majority of people did not want abortion. It was anathema to 95 per cent of them who
were Catholic and we thought that our Constitution protected the unborn. We also
thought that there were not any abortion referral groups here in Dublin. The decision in
the McGee case in 1973 and the simultaneous decision in the Roe v. Wade case in North
America in the same year brought us to our senses. From that time on we who were
interested in unborn human life knew that we must do something."
44
Roman Catholic fundamentalists responded to this perceived threat by
seeking the absolute protection of fetal life. Before going on to show
how the meaning of the X case is produced through its incorporation
into this fundamentalist narrative, I want to outline the aspect of
fundamentalism as a theoretical construct that permits us to understand
how fundamentalism is informed by the social relations of which it is a
part.
Narrative provides a way of thinking through the relationship
between the form of fundamentalism that operates in the Irish abortion
context and the interpretation it gives to particular events in the legal
regulation of abortion. But in order to understand the relationship
between Irish Roman Catholic fundamentalism and the social conditions
of its existence, we need to articulate the relationship between narrative
and ideology. The fundamentalist narrative orders, and thereby
interprets, social content in such a way that we recognize that content as
fundamentalism. The social content that is narratavized, however, is
43 The fundamentalist representation of Roman Catholic doctrine as never permitting
abortion obscures the extent to which Roman Catholic doctrine is and has been informed by a
diversity of moral views on abortion. See, for example, Father S. Fagan, "More Heat than Light
from Confused Language" The Irish Times (15 December 1997), available on the Internet at
http://www.irish-times.com, who argues that abortion has rarely been publicly discussed in Ireland
within the "full context of moral responsibility."
44 Supra note 35 at 19-20.
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ideological. Fundamentalism is ideological in the Althusserian sense
that it "represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real
conditions of existence." 4 5 Fundamentalist ideology works on the
conditions of existence in Irish society by representing them so that the
subject understands his or her lived relationship with the world in
fundamentalist terms. Since "the real conditions of existence" can only
be known as they are represented in the subject's lived relationship with
his or her surroundings, these conditions do not operate as any external
referent for ideological representations. Thus, while fundamentalism as
narrative shows us how fundamentalism makes itself known,
fundamentalism as ideology provides us with a theoretical tool for
understanding how fundamentalism comes into being as "a system of
representations through which people live their relationship to the
historical world." 4 6 The process of fundamentalism's constitution
through its relationship with Irish society will become clearer if I point to
some of the social material that fundamentalist ideology puts to work in
its construction of the need for Irish law to absolutely protect the right to
life of the fetus.
Historically, Roman Catholicism has played a key role in social
regulation in the Republic of Ireland and a majority of Irish people
continue to identify themselves as Roman Catholics and to attend Mass
services. The 1990 European Values Survey reported that 97 per cent of
those who expressed a denominational affiliation identified themselves
as Roman Catholic and that 85 per cent of them attended Mass
weekly.47 The dominance of Roman Catholicism can be explained as a
reaction to the experience of British colonization, 48 under which the
45 L. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays, trans. B. Brewster (London: New Left
Books, 1971) c. 5, entitled, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" at 153. See further T.
Eagleton, Ideology:An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991).
46 See Mich~le Barrett's discussion of the Althusserian concept of ideology in the context of
other Marxian theories of ideology and the poststructuralist (Foucauldian) challenge posed thereto,
in his The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991) at 83.
47 M.P. Hornsby-Smith & C.T. Whelan, "Religious and Moral Values" in C.T. Whelan, ed.,
Values and Social Change in Ireland (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1994) 7 at 11. By 1996, the figure
for those attending Mass once a week had dropped to 66 per cent of those polled, the moral
authority of the Catholic Church having been shaken by a series of clerical sexual abuse cases, and
the revelation that Bishop Eamonn Casey had a teenage son living in the U.S., among other
scandals: "Poll Shows Church's Moral Authority in Decline" The Irish Times (16 December 1996),
available on the Internet at http://www.irish-times.com.
48 While the English invasion of Ireland began with the arrival of the Anglo-Normans in 1169,
military conquest was not achieved by the English until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By
1603 all of Ireland had come under the control of the English Crown. In 1801 Ireland was formally
united with Great Britain, becoming part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. In
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Irish were persecuted as Roman Catholics and encouraged to convert to
Anglicanism. Prior to Roman Catholic emancipation in 1829, Irish
Roman Catholics were, among other things, denied the right to vote or
to be elected to Parliament, the right to hold property, or to attend
school. Until 1922, when the twenty-six counties of the Republic of
Ireland achieved independence, and to this day in the six counties of
Northern Ireland, the struggle for national self-determination was
historically linked to the religious practice of Roman Catholicism.
Between the 1920s and 1960s, the young Irish nation state
institutionalized Roman Catholicism as a marker of Irish national
identity through such activities as the adoption of a Constitution in 1937
which privileged the role of the Roman Catholic Church and imposed a
ban on divorce,49 and through its reliance on and support of the Church
in its provision of health, welfare, and education services. 50 Given these
factors, the dominance of censorship,a1 and the insularity of Ireland as
an island and as a collection of predominantly rural communities,
Roman Catholicism continued to function as the principal lens through
which Irish people perceived moral and social issues until challenged by
the effects of urbanization and industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s.
Ireland's becoming a member of the European Economic Community
in 1972 and the influence of mass media were also significant factors in
the undermining of the role of Roman Catholicism as a force of moral
regulation.52
Therefore, Ireland's status as a post-colonial state plays a role in
explaining how Roman Catholicism came to be such a strong force of
social regulation in Ireland, and provides some of the social material
which fundamentalist ideology works with in constructing a system of
1922 the twenty-six counties of the South became the Irish Free State, which would go on to become
the Republic of Ireland. The six counties of the North remained a part of what is now known as the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In this manner, the mainly agricultural
and Catholic South was partitioned from the mainly industrial and Protestant North. For one useful
historical account see G.M. MacMillan, State, Society and Authority in Ireland: The Foundation of the
Modem State (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1993).
49 Article 44 of the 1937 Constitution recognized the special place of the Catholic Church in
Irish society, and was only removed by referendum in 1972. A constitutional ban on divorce (Article
41(3)(2)) eliminated the option of applying for divorce through a parliamentary bill inherited from
English law by the Irish Free State in 1922, and was only amended by referendum in 1995 to allow
for divorce in certain circumstances.
50 See J. Whyte, "Church, State and Society, 1950-70" in J.J. Lee, ed., Ireland 1945-70 (Dublin:
Gill and Macmillan, 1979) 73; and T. Inglis, Moral Monopoly: The Catholic Church in Modem Irish
Society (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987).
51 See M. Kelly, "Censorship and the Media" in A. Connelly, ed., Gender and the Law in
Ireland (Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 1993) 185.
52 See Hornsby-Smith & Whelan, supra note 47.
1998]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
representations through which Irish subjects understand their
relationship with their world. Post-coloniality, as I use it, refers to the
effects of the historical experience of colonization on societies that have
since gained independence.53 Post-colonial theory54 explains how the
systems of values and representations that socially legitimated the
colonial authority continue to affect the colony even after legal authority
has been transferred back to the colony.5 5 The theory contributes the
insight that the representation and value systems which hierarchized the
relations between colonial ruler and "native"-constructing the former
as civilized and developed, and the latter as primitive and
underdeveloped-do not simply disappear with the colonized state's
achievement of legal sovereignty. The complex differences and
interactions between colonizer and colonized continue to be obscured in
a post-colonial context by dominant interpretations of one as the inverse
of the other. Post-colonial theory explores the ways in which a society
that has formally achieved sovereignty from its former colonizer
continues to filter, resist, and appropriate imperialist values and
representations of itself, and to figure in the formation of those values
and representations.
Irish nationalist ideology intersects with post-coloniality in its
constitution of nation and national identity in opposition to the
nationalist representation of the British colonizer. Whether one
interprets nationalism as the politics of an "imagined community" 6 or as
anti-imperialist struggle, Irish nationalism has historically relied on
53 See L. Gibbons, Transformations in Irish Culture (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1996) c. 14, entitled, "Unapproved Roads: Ireland and Post-Colonial Identity" at 174, where
he criticizes B. Asheroft, G. Griffiths & H. Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back- Theory and Practice in
Post-Colonial Literatures (London: Routledge, 1989), for their exclusion of Irish literature from this
survey.
54 One of the "founding" texts of post-colonial theory is E.W. Said, Orientalism, 1st ed. (New
York: Vintage Books, 1979). For a critique of Orientalism see A. Ahmad, In Theory: Classes,
Nations, Literatures (London: Verso, 1992) c. 5, entitled, "Orientalism and After: Ambivalence and
Metropolitan Location in the Work of Edward Said." See also B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths & H. Tiffin,
eds., The Post-Colonial Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 1995). For examples of feminist
engagements with post-colonial theory, see R. Sunder Rajan, Real and Imagined Women: Gender,
Culture and Post-Colonialism (London: Routledge, 1993); and L. Abu-Odeh, "Post-Colonial
Feminism and the Veil: Considering the Differences" (1992) 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 1527.
55 In the case of Ireland, post-colonial theory has been chiefly used in literary and cultural
criticism. See D. Lloyd, Anomalous States: Irish Writing and the Post-Colonial Moment (Dublin:
Lilliput Press, 1993); and D. Kiberd, Inventing Ireland (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1996).
56 See B.R. O'G. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
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religion as a marker of difference in its invocation of the particularity of
the Irish nation.57 Hence the Irish nation state represented its legal
endorsement of Roman Catholic values as a reclamation of something
distinctly Irish from its distortion through the British colonial
suppression of Catholicism. Fundamentalist ideology, on the other
hand, puts post-coloniality to work in its representation of the necessity
of the absolute authority of the dominant national religion in order to
prevent or combat the nation's self-distortion through secularization. In
post-Independence Ireland the role that law played in constructing Irish
identity as Catholic was part of a nationalist ideology of Irishness; in the
1980s, in contrast, the engagement with law was part of a fundamentalist
ideology of Catholicness. While nationalism emphasized a need to resist
a threat from without-from Britain-in its construction of Irish
identity, fundamentalism emphasized a need to resist a threat from
within-secularization-in its assertion of the Catholicness of Irish
identity. Irish fundamentalist ideology mobilized the postcolonial
attachment to Roman Catholicism in its representation of the need for
the absolute legal protection of fetal life in order to resist the weakening
of Roman Catholicism's hold on the regulation of reproduction.
Luke Gibbons notes that what have come to be recognized as
traditional Irish values-myths of community, the sanctity of the family,
devotion to faith and fatherland-date from the period of the
"devotional revolution"58 in post-Famine Ireland.59 He says:
The "traditionalism" and religious conservatism associated with the west of Ireland, for
example, so evident in the results of the abortion and divorce referenda, is a
comparatively late development, given that in the early nineteenth century Connacht [the
Western Province of Ireland] was the region with the least not the highest, Mass
attendance, with figures in some places falling as low as 20 per cent. 60
In the post-Famine era the centralization of church control was part of a
modernizing phenomenon which included the tenant farmers' struggle
for ownership of the land they worked, and the revival of cultural as well
as political nationalism. Five years before the Famine, in 1840, there
was one priest to every 3,500 laity, but by 1900 that figure was one to
5 7 On Irish nationalism, see D.G. Boyce, Nationalism in Ireland (London: Croom Helm, 1982).
58 See Inglis, supra note 50 for an account of the devotional revolution.
59 For a history of the Irish Famine in which 1 million died and in the aftermath of which
several million more emigrated, see R.D. Edwards & T.D. Williams, eds., The Great Famine: Studies
in Irish History, 1845-52 (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 1995).
60 Gibbons, supra note 53, c. 6, entitled, "Coming Out of Hibernation? The Myth of
Modernization in Irish Culture" at 86 [hereinafter "Coming Out"].
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every 900.61 When fundamentalism insists on the cultural authenticity of
Irish traditional values and on the need for their observance in order to
combat social ills, it fails to recognize that those very values were
historically produced.
Gibbons argues further that what he calls the conservative social
backlash of the 1980s (that is the success of the 1983 "pro-life"
amendment and the defeat of the pro-divorce amendment in 1987) is not
inconsistent with Ireland's economic development from the 1960s on
because economic progress was constructed in Ireland as a form of
cooperation between tradition and modernity rather than as a modern
growth away from tradition. The cultural link between capitalist
development and social liberalization present in other capitalist liberal
democracies was weak in Ireland because capitalism ideologically
represented Irish cultural heritage and rural, communal, and familial
values as assets for economic development rather than as disadvantages
that had to be overcome. For example the promotional material of the
Industrial Development Authority, when seeking foreign investment,
represented Ireland's peripheral status as an advantage with literature
bearing such slogans as: "Missing the Industrial Revolution was the Best
Thing that ever happened to the Irish." Given the capitalist state's
representation of Ireland's post-colonial status as a distinct advantage
for foreign investors, it is not so difficult to see how, as Gibbons suggests,
"the 'conservative backlash', or the reversion to traditional values of
family, faith and fatherhood, may not be an aberration but may even be
a logical extension of the modernization policies pursued by successive
governments and development agencies." 6 2 Fundamentalism's
mobilization of the post-colonial attachment to Roman Catholicism in
its quest for the absolute protection of fetal life, was consistent with
other kinds of state mobilization of post-coloniality, and as such was not
perceived as threatening to state control or social order.
The patriarchal organization of Irish society also provides
material for fundamentalism to work with in its ideological constitution
of the need for the absolute protection of fetal life. The constitutional
provisions on the family are one example of the evidence of the
patriarchal organization of Irish society. Article 41 of the Irish
Constitution, 1937 provides:
61 Rossiter, supra note 39 at 81.
62 "Coming Out," supra note 60 at 91-92.
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1. 1. The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit
group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible
rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law.
1.2. The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution and
authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the
Nation and the State.
2. 1. In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman
gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved.
2. 2. The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be
obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the
home.
3. 1. The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of Marriage,
on which the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack.
The existence of constitutional provisions that idealize the role of
women as homemakers, privilege the family based on marriage, and
suggest that women who engage in paid labour outside the home are
neglectful is, in itself, at least symbolically significant given the status of
the Constitution as the primary law and the measure of legislation.
If the courts had chosen to ignore such provisions, however, one
could dismiss them as empty promises, but the courts have instead relied
on Article 41 to forestall progressive change in family law. For example,
in In the matter of Article 26 of the Constitution and in the matter of The
Matrimonial Home Bill 199363 the Supreme Court held that the Bill,
which provided that a beneficial interest would vest in both spouses as
joint tenants where either or both spouses were entitled to a legal or
beneficial interest in the matrimonial home, was unconstitutional.
Although the Court was of the view that the encouragement of joint
ownership of the matrimonial home was an important element of the
common good conducive to the stability of marriage, it found that the
Bill did not represent a reasonably proportionate state intervention into
the rights of the family. The Bill was found unconstitutional in violating
Article 41 by constituting a failure on the state's part to protect the
authority of the family as it would, in some instances, cancel a joint
decision relating to the ownership of the matrimonial home that was
"freely" made prior to the legislation. I refer to this example of Irish
law's role in the patriarchal organization of familial relations in order to
draw attention to the gender relations which fundamentalist ideology
could put to work in its quest to absolutize the value of fetal life in Irish
society. Given that women's confinement to the domestic sphere was
63 [1994] 1 I.R. 305 (S.C.).
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already justified by the idealization of a woman's role as homemaker, by
the condoning of wives' material dependency on their husbands, and by
the assumption that women's entry into familial relations is free and not
socially conditioned, the fundamentalist ideological construction of
women as self-sacrificing mothers had rich soil in which to take root.
Fundamentalism seeks to resolve its cultural anxiety about the
values which are being cultivated in a particular society by asserting the
absolute observance of its religious values as the solution to social
problems. When women are construed as responsible for social
reproduction, an ideology that represents particular values as socially
necessary will have effects on the interpretation of women's social
roles. 64 Since social reproduction encompasses not only the labour of
biological reproduction but also the socialization of children, the
gendered construction of women as responsible for social reproduction
marks them as a focus for fundamentalism's concern about which social
values and behaviours are being passed on. Hence, fundamentalist
ideology puts gender relations to work by representing the need for the
control of women and their bodies in the interests of transmitting
particular cultural values. The fundamentalist representation of the
absolute value of fetal life operates to assert the importance of particular
cultural values to Irish society and to tie women to the role of
transmitting those values to the next generation by denying women
permission to opt out of the role of motherhood.
One of the senses in which fundamentalist ideology is absolutist
is because it understands all Irish women to be subject to its
consequences. Neither the circumstances nor status of any woman
justifies an exception to the absolute protection of fetal life. The
campaign to stop the provision of information about abortion services
abroad demonstrates that anti-abortion fundamentalists were not
satisfied with the absence of abortion services within the state in their
quest to stop Irish women from having abortions. However, in its effort
to deny all Irish women access to abortion, fundamentalism ignores the
effects of class relations in Irish society. The economic privilege that
accrues to class position allowed, and continues to allow, middle-class
women to escape the effects of fundamentalist ideology. The provision
of abortion services in Britain has meant that abortion has always been
available to those who could fund the trip and the cost of the abortion
64 See V. Moghadam, ed., Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertion and Feminisms in
International Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); N. Yuval-Davis & F. Anthias, eds.,
Woman-Nation-State (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1989); and G. Meaney, "Sex and Nation: Women in
Irish Culture and Politics" in E. Boland et al., eds., A Dozen Lips (Dublin: Attic Press, 1994) 188.
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service in a private clinic (approximately $1,000). And for as long as
abortion services have been medically provided in Britain, there have
always been Irish women who crossed the Irish Sea to terminate their
pregnancies.
Irish sociologist Pauline Jackson65 has commented on the fall in
numbers of prosecutions for back street abortions in Ireland following
the impact in Britain of the R v. Bourne66 decision. The liberalization of
abortion law in Britain in 1967 made abortion services more widely and
easily available.67 Class privilege means that all women are not equally
subject to the effects of fundamentalist ideology. Thus, fundamentalist
ideology has the effect of being discriminatory against poor women
because they are less well positioned to avoid the application of the law.
This example of the way in which class limits the effects of
fundamentalist ideology also provides us with an instance of ideology's
attempt to smooth out contradictions in the social conditions with which
it engages. Fundamentalism represents all women as equal in their
subordination to the value of fetal life. Class, however, does not
construe all women equally, since economically privileged women can
evade this subordination. Fundamentalism is revealed as ideology when
the effects of class clarify that the woman which fundamentalism invokes
is a representation, and, as a particular representation of womanhood, it
does not accommodate the woman constructed by class.
Fundamentalist ideology is made coherent through its
narrativization. To quote White: "Narrative is at once a mode of
discourse ... and the product produced by the adoption of this mode of
discourse." 68 Narrative reveals the practices of fundamentalist ideology;
it makes it possible for us to recognize fundamentalist ideology at work.
Once we recognize the X case as the last chapter of a fundamentalist
legal narrative, that narrative is revealed in its totality and the pieces of
the story begin to fall into place. That the attorney general of a liberal
democratic state could take steps to stop a fourteen year old rape victim
65 P.C. Jackson, "Outside the Jurisdiction: Irish Women Seeking Abortion" in Smyth, ed.,
supra, note 17, 119. Jackson notes further that with the imposition of travel restrictions during the
Second World War, the number of Irish prosecutions for back street abortions rose again.
66 [1939] K.B. 687 (Central Criminal Court) [hereinafter Bourne]. This case concerned the
criminal prosecution of a doctor for an unlawful abortion under s. 58 of the Offences Against the
Person Act, 1861 (U.K.), 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100. Macnaghten J. held that an abortion which was
performed in order to prevent the pregnant woman becoming "a physical or mental wreck" was
performed in good faith for the purposes of saving her life, and was not unlawful.
6 7 The AbortionAct 1967 (U.tK), 1967, c. 87.
68 Supra note 40 at 57.
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from travelling abroad for an abortion is not such a difficult decision to
understand once we locate it as part of a fundamentalist narrative;
likewise the decision of the High Court to grant the injunction. The X
case reveals the fundamentalist narrative and invokes its closure as
public outrage at the High Court decision puts extreme pressure on the
Supreme Court, which ultimately decides to lift the injunction. But what
are the other chapters of the story? What other legal events in recent
Irish history played a role in constructing the fundamentalist narrative of
Irish abortion law?
During the 1970s two legal events, in particular, signalled that
Roman Catholicism was losing its grasp on the legal regulation of Irish
people's moral lives. In 1974, a majority of the Supreme Court held in
McGee69 that the right to marital privacy was one of the unspecified
personal rights guaranteed by Article 40(3)(1)70 of the Constitution.
Therefore, section 17 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1935,71
which prohibited the importation of contraceptives for personal use, was
found unconstitutional because it violated Mrs. McGee's right to marital
privacy. This decision was regarded as a significant rebuttal of Roman
Catholic doctrine, both in its striking down of the legislative provision
thereby accepting the validity of contraceptive use, and in its recognition
of a right to privacy, albeit marital privacy. Given that in Roe v. Wade72
the United States Supreme Court had determined that the unspecified
constitutional right to privacy, first recognized in a case concerning
contraceptives, 3 gave Jane Roe a right to abortion, the McGee decision
was seen as laying the ground for further liberalization of the legal
regulation of reproduction.
The other significant legal event that opened the fundamentalist
narrative was the introduction and passing of an Act that legalized the
provision and sale of contraception. Although the Health (Family
69 Supra note 16. Mary McGee was a 29-year-old mother of four whose heart condition meant
that her life would be endangered by another pregnancy. The case arose after the contraceptives
she sought to import were confiscated by the customs authorities under the relevant Act. For a
feminist critique of this decision, see L. Flynn, "Missing Mary McGee: The Narration of Woman in
Constitutional Adjudication" in Dr. G. Quinn, Dr. A. Ingram & S. Livingstone, eds., Justice and
Legal Theory in Ireland (Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 1995) 91.
70 It provides: "The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its
laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen."
71 Acts of the Oireachtas (Ireland) 1935, No. 6.
72 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
73 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Note also a later case that established a right
to distribute contraceptives: Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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Planning) Act 1979,74 introduced by Health Minister Charles Haughey,
provided for the sale of contraceptives in very restricted circumstances,75
its legitimization of artificial contraception and the practice of
reproductive control was significant in itself, and in its rejection of the
vigorous opposition mounted against this legislation by conservative
Roman Catholic groups. These legal changes were interpreted as
representing a threat to the regulatory force of Roman Catholicism in
Irish society, particularly in matters of sexuality and reproduction. The
fundamentalist response to this perceived threat was to build a campaign
for the constitutional endorsement of a fetal right to life.76
The Pro-Life Amendment Campaign (PLAC) held its founding
conference on 24 January 1981 in Dublin. A glance at the list of
organizations represented at the meeting indicates the dominance of a
Roman Catholic ethos in the campaign.77 On 27 April 1981, PLACwas
officially launched and a draft amendment was unveiled at the press
conference. The draft constitutional amendment read: "The State
recognizes the absolute right to life of every unborn child from
conception and accordingly guarantees to respect and protect such right
by law." The reference to "the absolute right to life of every unborn
child from conception" indicates clearly an adherence to an absolutist
interpretation of Roman Catholic doctrine which denounces any direct
interference with "god given life," and recognizes conception as the
moment when god gives life to the "unborm." The recognition of the
fetus as having a right to life from the moment of conception is
74 Acts of the Oireachtas (Ireland) 1979, No. 20.
75 The Act provided that all contraceptives, including condoms and spermicides, would be
available only on prescription from a doctor. Before prescribing contraception, the doctor had to
ensure that "the person required the contraceptives for the purpose, bona fide, of family planning
or for adequate medical reasons and in appropriate circumstances." The Act also advocated the
promotion of "natural" family planning methods. In justifying the restrictive nature of the Act,
Haughey used a now infamous phrase: "This Bill seeks to provide an Irish solution to an Irish
problem. I have not regarded it as necessary that we should conform to the position obtaining in
any other country": see O'Reilly, supra note 35 at 51.
76 See Hesketh, supra note 32; and O'Reilly, supra note 35, for detailed accounts of the
background and operation of the campaign.
77 The following groups attended the conference: Congress of Catholic Secondary School
Parents' Association, Irish Catholic Doctors' Guild, Council of Social Concern, Guild of Catholic
Nurses, Guild of Catholic Pharmacists, Catholic Young Men's Society, St. Thomas More Society,
Responsible Society, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, Irish Pro-Life Movement,
National Association of the Ovulation Method-Ireland, St. Joseph's Young Priest's Society, and
the Christian Brothers School Parents' Federation. The Irish Nurses' Organization, Muintir na
Tire, and Pax Christi Christian Life Communities all sent messages of support: see Hesketh, supra
note 32.
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peculiarly Roman Catholic and is not subscribed to by other Christian
churches in Ireland. It was the recognition of the particularly Roman
Catholic ethos informing PLAC that caused the Irish Protestant Churches
to support the Anti-Amendment Campaign (iAc). By June 1982, each
of the main Protestant Churches in Ireland-Anglican, Presbyterian,
and Methodist -had issued official statements opposing the idea of a
"pro-life" amendment being enshrined in the Constitution.
The Aoc was officially launched in April 1982. A diverse group
of feminists, socialists and liberals, the AAC raised five objections to the
idea of a "pro-life" constitutional amendment. These were: (1) the
amendment would do nothing to solve the problem of unwanted
pregnancies; (2) the amendment allowed for no exceptions even in cases
where pregnancy severely threatened a woman's health, or in cases of
rape or incest; (3) the amendment sought to enshrine in the Constitution
the teaching of one religious denomination; (4) the amendment would
impede further public discussion and possible legislation on abortion;
and (5) that at a time of severe unemployment and when one third of the
population was living at or below the poverty line, the referendum would
be an irresponsible waste of public funds.
A bitter and divisive campaign ensued that ultimately resulted in
the following proposed constitutional amendment being put before the
people on 7 September 1983: "The State acknowledges the right to life
of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the
mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its
laws to defend and vindicate that right." Fifty-four per cent of the
electorate turned out to vote and the amendment was accepted by a
majority of 67 per cent to 33 per cent. Hence, Irish Roman Catholic
fundamentalists were successful in their campaign to persuade the Irish
government and the people that the protection of fetal life merited
constitutional endorsement. They were not successful, however, in
securing a constitutional amendment which expressed the need for the
absolute protection of fetal life, given that Article 40(3)(3) qualified the
right to life of the fetus by reference to the equal right to life of the
mother, and by the "as far as practicable" limitation. Pt.Ac's success in
having a fetal right to life constitutionally recognized provided another
installment in the fundamentalist narrative that began with McGee and
would end with X. One significant element of the narrative is still
missing at this point, however, and that element is the absolutist legal
enforcement of the fetal right to life. I argue that this element was
provided by the Irish courts in three cases when they interpreted Article
40(3)(3) as requiring injunctions against pregnancy counselling centres
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and student unions in order to stop them providing women with abortion
information.
IV. FUNDAMENTALISM IN IRISH LAW
In order to show that Irish law was informed by fundamentalist
premises it is not necessary to point directly to judicial references to
fundamentalist values. Even if I wanted to make my argument in this
way it would be almost impossible since Irish judges may be generally
faulted for the insubstantial explanations they provide for their legal
conclusions. Rather, in order to argue that the decisions in the three
cases are informed by a fundamentalist abortion narrative, I have to
extrapolate from what the judges did say to what they did not; I have to
show how fundamentalist assumptions implicitly informed the judicial
interpretation of Article 40(3)(3).
I argue that the courts' failure to consider how women's
constitutional rights might limit the degree of protection due the fetal
right to life is evidence of their absolutism, particularly given that the
text of Article 40(3)(3), the usual principle of constitutional
interpretation, and the relevance of other legal rules, did not necessitate
such an interpretation. The Supreme Court's acceptance that sPuc
should be allowed standing to enforce the fetal right to life in the
absence of a particular factual case of pregnancy, and despite the fact
that private groups whose interests are not directly affected are not
generally permitted to seek the enforcement of law against other private
groups, is evidence that the court identified the private interests of a
fundamentalist group with the public interest in enforcing the law.
When the Supreme Court rejected the argument that European
Community law was relevant to the determination of the lawfulness of
abortion information they departed from their usual willingness to apply
EC law. In so doing, they demonstrated a desire to isolate Irish abortion
law from the effects of supranational legal regulation and provided
further evidence that their interpretation of the fetal life was informed
by a fundamentalist narrative.
In the first case, Open Door,78 the Supreme Court granted the
attorney general's request and issued a perpetual injunction against two
78 Supra note 11.
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non-directive pregnancy counselling centres, 79 preventing them from
distributing the names, telephone numbers and addresses of abortion
clinics abroad to women seeking their counselling services. The
injunction was issued on the grounds that the defendants' distribution of
such information amounted to assistance in the destruction of "unborn"
life and, as such, was unlawful because it violated the constitutional right
to life of the "unborn" as protected by Article 40(3)(3). The Supreme
Court injunction was more restrictive than the one issued at the trial
level in 1986 by Hamilton P. (President of the High Court) that had, in
general terms, prohibited the defendants from counselling or assisting
pregnant women to obtain further advice on abortion or to obtain an
abortion.
In the second case, Coogan,80 the Supreme Court overturned the
decision of Ms. Justice Carroll in the High Court and granted sPuc
standing to seek an injunction preventing an alleged breach of
constitutional rights. sPuc sought an injunction against the officers of
University College Dublin's Students' Union (UCDSU) in order to stop
their publication of abortion information, on the grounds that it
amounted to a violation of the right to life of the "unborn." Carroll J.
had refused to grant the injunction, holding that sPuc lacked the
standing reserved to the attorney general to seek undertakings and
injunctions to restrain threatened breaches of the Constitution. In a
private capacity and without the cooperation of the attorney general,
sPuc was seeking an injunction to prevent UCDSU publishing information
about abortion services abroad in their student union guidebooks.
However, in the Supreme Court, her decision was overruled on the
grounds that any party who had a bona fide concern and interest in the
protection of the constitutionally guaranteed right to life of the
"unborn" had sufficient standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts
to take such measures, as would defend and vindicate that right. The
case was remitted to the High Court to deal with the interlocutory
injunctions, at which point the plaintiff, spuc, decided to seek injunctions
against the officers of three students unions: Union of Students in
79 To North American lawyers it will seem unusual that the plaintiff's attempt to use the
Constitution against private organizations was not questioned. However, the Irish Constitution has
been interpreted as conferring a right of action for breach of constitutionally protected rights
against persons other than the State and its officials, at least since The Educational Company of
Ireland Ltd. and Another v. Fitzpatrick and Others, [1961] I.R. 345 (S.C.). Thus, unlike in other
jurisdictions, there is no need to establish the involvement of a "state action" in order to claim a
violation of constitutional rights: see J.T. Lang, "Private Law Aspects of the Irish Constitution"
(1971) 6 Irish Jurist 237.
8 0 Supra note 11.
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Ireland, Trinity College Dublin Students' Union, and the defendants in
the original request for an injunction, UCDSU.
In the third case, Grogan,81 sPuc sought an injunction against the
fourteen officers of the three above mentioned student unions and their
printer/publisher stopping them from publishing information about
abortion services abroad in their student guidebooks. In the High Court,
Carroll J. declined to grant the interlocutory injunction sought, on the
ground that she first required an interpretation of European Community
(Ec) law from the European Court of Justice (EcI) in order to be able to
determine the lawfulness of the provision of information about abortion
services legally provided abroad. The defendants argued that even if
distribution of information about abortion services was not protected by
domestic law, it was protected by EC law that took precedence over
domestic law. The defendants' argument was based on the claim that
the freedom of movement of services between Member States, protected
by Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC), 8 2 implied a right to give and receive information
about the availability of abortion services lawfully provided outside the
state. On appeal, the Supreme Court interpreted Carroll J.'s judgment
as two decisions: the decision to refer a point of EC law for interpretation
to the ECJ, which it could not alter, and the appealable decision not to
grant the injunction. The Supreme Court granted sPuc the injunction on
the grounds that sPuc was in full accord with Irish constitutional law in
seeking to restrain an activity which the court had declared violated
Article 40(3)(3)'s protection of the right to life of the "unborn."8 3
A. An Absolute Fetal Right to Life
In each of these three cases the Irish judiciary, with the exception
of Carroll J. in the High Court, interpreted the constitutional right to life
of the "unborn" as justifying the constraint of the distribution of
abortion information without formally framing their method of
81 Supra note 11.
82 25 March 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEc Treaty].
83 This injunction was finally lifted in March 1997: see The Society for the Protection of the
Unborn Child v. Grogan and Others, [19971 No. 317/92 (LEXIS/NEXIS) (S.C.) [hereinafter Grogan
1997].
1998]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
interpreting competing legal claims,8 4 and with little or no substantive
consideration of how other constitutionally endorsed interests should be
accommodated when enforcing the fetal right to life. In asserting,
without substantively reasoning, that the fetal right to life required the
relevant injunctions requested by spuc, the judiciary adopted a
fundamentalist interpretation of the value of fetal life.
Article 40(3)(3) requires the state to defend and vindicate the
right to life of the "unborn" as far as practicable and with due regard to
the equal right to life of the mother. Therefore, the language of Article
40(3)(3) suggests that a court ought to have regard to other interests in
interpreting what it means to vindicate the right to life of the "unborn,"
and that the latter right may be qualified by such interests. The fact that
Article 40(3)(3) adopts positive rather than negative terminology-it
requires the state to act for the protection of fetal life and not merely to
refrain from acting against fetal life-ought to increase, rather than
decrease, judicial concern for how such state action might be qualified.
In other words, because Article 40(3)(3) contemplates that the state
might have to do something, rather than to not do something, it
envisages that the state has to take responsibility for the changes it
makes to the status quo through its positive action, changes which might
affect other legal interests. If such an action were to have the effect of
offending another constitutional interest, such as women's rights, then
the court might be justified in finding that the action was more than what
was practicable in defending the fetal right to life.
Furthermore, other fundamental rights provisions of the Irish
Constitution adopt more absolutist language than Article 40(3)(3).85
For example, Article 41(1)(1) refers to the "inalienable and
imprescriptible rights" of the family, rights that the Supreme Court has
held to be restrictable. 86 If the courts can qualify rights that are framed
in such unqualified language, then it is even more difficult to explain
how it is consistent as a matter of legal interpretation to construe a right
that is framed in qualified language as if it was unqualified.
84 James Friedman criticizes the courts for failing to develop an adequate interpretative
framework for competing constitutional rights in his, "On the Dangers of Moral Certainty and
Sacred Trusts: The Judgments in the SPUC Case and the Issue of Free Speech" (1988) 10 D.U.L.J.
71.
85 See Constitution Review Group, supra note 5 at 215, where the Review Group argues that the
constitution's qualifying clauses need an overhaul. They note further that: "there are few rights-
however fundamental-which can be regarded as absolute or not subject to qualification."
8 6 Murray v. Ireland and the Attorney General, [1985] I.R. 532 (S.C.). The Supreme Court
rejected the claim made by prisoners who were husband and wife and serving life sentences that the
absence of conjugal facilities was an infringement of their family rights.
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In Open Door, Coogan, and Grogan, the courts did not have
regard to the qualifying clauses of Article 40(3)(3) when they considered
whether the distribution of abortion information should be restrained as
a breach of the fetal right to life. In the High Court, in Open Door,
Hamilton P. declared, "I do not, in the circumstances of this case, have
to have regard to the effect of 'the equal right to life of the mother' on
the right to life of the unborn acknowledged by this Article."87 On
appeal to the Supreme Court, Finlay C.J. said:
It was not part of the facts of this case nor of the submissions of the defendants that the
service which they were providing for pregnant women in relation to the obtaining of
abortion outside this jurisdiction was in any way confined to, or especially directed
towards, the due regard to the equal right of life of the mother mentioned in the sub-
section of the Constitution which I have already quoted, and this portion of that sub-
section did not therefore arise for interpretation or decision in this case. 88
Once the Supreme Court held that there was no need to have "due
regard to the equal right to life of the mother," given that there was no
particular woman claiming that right before the Court, the two cases that
followed also assumed that there was no need to consider Article
40(3)(3)'s reference to the pregnant woman's right to life as a limitation
on the fetal right to life. Their conclusion that the absence of a
particular woman asserting her right to life before the Court was
sufficient to omit consideration of a woman's right altogether was an
amazing deduction given the fact that there was no particular fetus
before the courts never stopped them from asserting the rights of the
"unborn." While the judiciary expressed no hesitation in enforcing the
private right of the fetus, they saw no need to even consider how the
private right of the woman might limit the interest in protecting fetal
life. Interestingly, in the case that eventually lifted the injunction on
appeal in March 1997, two of the five Supreme Court judges took the
view that the decision not to consider the equal right to life of the
mother was an erroneous legal finding. 9
In failing to consider how the fetal right to life might be qualified
by reference to a woman's rights, the courts also disregarded the
significance of the factual circumstances of pregnancy for the
8 7 Open Door, supra note 11 at 617.
88 Ibid. at 621.
8 9 They were Mrs. Justice Denham, the first woman appointed to the Supreme Court, and Mr.
Justice Keane, in Grogan 1997, supra note 83 at 19, 36 respectively. Chief Justice Hamilton and
Justices Barrington and Blayney were of the view that the injunction could not be confirmed on
appeal, because the law as it now was (L., post-1995 Act's legalization of abortion information) did
not so require: see supra note 24.
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interpretation of the legal interests raised. The factual context of
pregnancy means that a woman sustains a fetus within her body during
pregnancy. Any action taken on behalf of or towards the fetus will
necessarily affect the pregnant woman. Any defence of fetal legal
interests will necessarily impact on a pregnant woman's interests. If one
considers how to defend a fetal right to life in isolation from a woman's
right to life, then one fails to acknowledge and take responsibility for the
way in which the former is dependent on the latter.
However, rather than exercise caution in the absence of any
particular factual case, the courts vindicated the right to life of the
"unborn" in broad general terms without adequately considering the
possible consequences for actual women. The judges denied a woman's
role in pregnancy at the same time as they relied on her to sustain that
pregnancy. The fetal right to life is discussed in these cases in general,
abstract terms that conceptualize the fetus as an independent rights-
bearing entity so that the concrete reality of the fetal position within, and
dependence on, the body of the woman is never addressed. In this way
the courts obscured the significance of birth as the moment when the
fetus emerges from the woman's body, establishes an independent
existence, and becomes capable of developing relationships with people
other than the pregnant woman.90
For example, in Grogan, Walsh J. commented:
The destruction of life is not an acceptable method of birth control. The qualification of
certain pregnancies as being "unwanted" is likewise a totally unacceptable criterion. The
total abandonment of young children or old persons or of those who by reason of
infirmity, mental or physical, or those who are unable to look after themselves too often
occurs throughout the world. There is clear evidence that they are unwanted by those
who abandon them. That would however provide no justification for their elimination. 9 1
This equation of unwanted pregnancies with abandoned young children
or old persons in terms of "those who are unable to look after
themselves" fails to acknowledge how the conditions of pregnancy make
the fetus distinct. The fetal location within the body of the pregnant
woman means that it cannot develop social relationships with other
people who could provide for its needs. Concern for the fetus is
necessarily mediated through the woman within whom it is nourished.
While one might have sympathy with Walsh J.'s protest at the lack of
care and respect for those who are unable to look after themselves, the
inclusion of the fetus within this category erases the presence of a
90 See M.A. Warren, "The Moral Significance of Birth" in H.B. Holmes & L.M. Purdy, eds.,
Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1992) 198.
91 Grogan, supra note 11 at 767.
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woman in pregnancy and mistakenly suggests that fetal interests can be
considered in isolation from those of the pregnant woman.
The courts also ignored the "as far as practicable" qualification
in Article 40(3)(3) when they interpreted the fetal right to life as
justifying the limitation of the distribution of abortion information.
They construed the fetal right to life as if it was an unrestricted right to
life. In the High Court, in Open Door, Hamilton P. commented:
The right to life of the unborn includes the right to have that right preserved and
defended and to be guarded against all threats to its existence before and after birth, and that
it lies not in the power of a parent to terminate its existence and that any action on the
part of any person endangering that life is necessarily not only an offence against the
common good but also against the guaranteed personal rights of the human life in
person.92
In failing to consider how the fetal right to life might be qualified,
Hamilton P. interpreted this interest as a stronger one than the ordinary
right to life. Apart from finding it necessary to assert the right to life of
the "unborn" after birth, Hamilton P. extended to the fetus rights which
persons do not usually have. If a person's right to life includes a right to
be guarded against all threats to his or her existence then that imposes a
duty on others to guard that person against such threats. So, on this
view, X could be under an obligation to guard Y against a threat to Y's
existence posed by Z, whether or not Z acted on that threat. On this
interpretation, a pharmacist could be violating A's right to life if she
gave B drugs to which A was fatally allergic whether or not B gave A
those drugs.
Given the sweeping nature of this interpretation one would
consider that Hamilton P. would explain why he considered that the fetal
right to life should impose such an obligation. But Hamilton P. offered
no explanation for why he considered it necessary to impose an
obligation on the pregnancy counselling centres not to threaten the
existence of the fetus by offering information which a pregnant woman
might or might not act upon. Not only did Hamilton P. fail to consider
how the right to life of the "unborn" might be qualified, he attributed to
it more superior value than a right to life might otherwise have. Thus,
the right to life of the "unborn" was attributed absolute value; it was
given more weight than other constitutional rights and interpreted as
imposing positive obligations without any consideration for the harmful
consequences on women of such an interpretation.
In the Supreme Court Finlay C.J. said:
92 Open Door, supra note 11 at 617 [emphasis added].
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The performing of an abortion on a pregnant woman terminates the unborn life which
she is carrying. Within the terms of Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 3 it is a direct destruction of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to life of that unborn child.
It must follow from this that there could not be an implied and unenumerated
constitutional right to information about the availability of a service of abortion outside
the State which, if availed of, would have the direct consequence of destroying the
expressly guaranteed constitutional right to life of the unborn. 93
Again, Finlay C.J. asserts that "it must follow from" the right to life of
the "unborn" that there could not be an implied right to abortion
information, but does not provide any explanation as to why this must be
so. His reference to "if availed of' indicates that a threatened potential,
rather than a threatened actual, breach of the fetal right to life is
sufficient to warrant the limitation of other constitutional interests when
enforcing the fetal right to life.
In Coogan, Walsh J described the student union's publication of
abortion information in their student manuals as "activities designed not
merely to evade the constitutional rights but totally to destroy them."94
He also collapsed the distinction between the actual and the potential
destruction of fetal life in his interpretation of the distribution of
abortion information as an activity designed to destroy a constitutional
right. In Grogan, Walsh J. said in the Supreme Court: "The very
wording of the 8th Amendment of the Constitution forecloses any
attempt to argue that life does not exist before birth."95 He assumed,
along with the rest of the Court, that the issue in question is the
existence of life before birth, rather than the nature of the legal claims
which derive from the recognition of a fetal right to life. The judicial
interpretation of the fetal right to life as justifying the relevant
injunctions was based on the assumption that the existence of a form of
human life, in which a right to life was constitutionally vested, conferred
an unrestricted right to life.
The assumption that Article 40(3)(3) justifies absolute
protection of fetal life fails to take into account the fact that there are
circumstances in which a right to life is not construed in law as imposing
a positive obligation on others to prevent a violation of that right. As
Judith Jarvis Thomson has argued in her application of the "good
samaritan" argument to abortion, recognizing a fetal right to life does
not mean that it is never justifiable to kill the fetus. Thomson argues
9 3 Ibid. at 625 [emphasis added].
9 4 Coogan, supra note 11 at 743.
95 Grogan, supra note 11 at 766.
[VOL. 36 NO. I
Irish Abortion Law 1986-1992
that even if one considers that the fetus is a person, a pregnant woman is
not obliged to allow it the use of her body. A pregnant woman's interest
in control of her body may justify a denial of the right to life of the
fetus.96
One of the ways in which Thomson makes her point is by asking
her audience to consider the case of a person who woke up one morning
to find that her biological system was supporting a famous violinist who
would die if "unplugged." She argues that the fact that it would be nice
of that person to continue biologically supporting the violinist does not
in itself impose an obligation on the person not to unplug herself. In
other words, Thomson illustrates the distinction between determining
that X ought to do something for Y and determining that Y has a right
against X to do it. Thomson claims that "the right to life consists not in
the right not to be killed, but rather in the right not to be killed
unjustly."97 Her analysis points to the fact that other factors play a role
both in determining when it is appropriate to move from a recognition
that an interest ought to be protected to actually grounding a right.
Within the liberal democratic tradition which informs our Constitution's
adherence to fundamental rights, the legal recognition of a right to life is
not usually considered as conferring an absolute right to life. The
relevant question is not whether the right to life was violated, but
whether it was unjustifiably violated.
This position is supported in law by, for example, the recognition
that no one is under an obligation to donate body organs where they are
needed for the survival of another person, not even a parent to a child.
However, the courts interpreted the right to life of the "unborn" as
imposing an obligation on any person not to endanger that life through
any action. This interpretation of the fetal right to life conflicts with the
more general policy in law that recognizes the harm that may be done in
imposing a positive obligation to save someone's life. Hence, in McFall
v. Shimp,98 an American court refused to compel a man to undergo a
96 J.J. Thomson, "A Defence of Abortion" (1971) 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 47.
9 7 Ibid. at 57.
98 127 Pitts. Leg. J. 14 (1978) [hereinafter Shimpl, cited in J. Gallagher, "Prenatal Invasions
and Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights?" (1987) 10 Harv. Women's L.J. 9. See S.
Bordo, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture and the Body (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993) c. 3, entitled, "Are Mothers Persons? Reproductive Rights and the Politics
of Subject-ivity." Bordo contrasts cases like Shimp in which "bodily integrity is privileged so highly
that judges have consistently refused to force individuals to submit without consent to medical
treatment even though the life of another hangs in the balance" with cases of court ordered
obstetrical interventions in which "[t]he essence of the pregnant woman, by contrast, is her
biological, purely mechanical role in preserving the life of another": at 73, 79.
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bone marrow transplant regarded by doctors as his cousin's only chance
to survive aplastic anemia. Judge John Flaherty said:
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides that one human being is
under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take action to save that human being or to
rescue .... For our law to compel the defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body
would change every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do so
would defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule which would know
no limits, and one could not imagine where the line would be drawn. 99
Thus, the fact that the fetus has a right to life does not in itself justify
interpreting that right as imposing positive obligations on others Without
explanation.
As a matter of constitutional law, the courts should have
interpreted the fetal right to life not as an isolated legal rule but in
relation to the whole Constitution of which it is a part. Other
constitutionally endorsed interests, such as women's constitutional
rights, should have informed the interpretation of Article 40(3)(3). The
courts normally apply the doctrine of harmonious interpretation, a kind
of principle of constitutional coherence, when construing constitutional
provisions. John Maurice Kelly describes this doctrine thus:
This is the principle that constitutional provisions should not be construed in isolation
from all the other parts of the Constitution among which they are embedded, but should
be so construed as to harmonise with the other parts. This doctrine is no more than a
presumption that the people who enacted the Constitution had a single scale of values,
and wished those values to permeate their charter evenly and without internal
discordance.1 00
Although the Supreme Court has held that where a harmonious
interpretation is not possible it may be necessary to hierarchize
constitutional rights,101 the first task of the Court is normally to seek a
harmonious interpretation. This principle of constitutional
interpretation should have guided the courts to contextualize the fetal
right to life with regard to other provisions of the Constitution, and to
consider what other constitutional provisions meant for its
interpretation. However, the courts dismissed or ignored other
constitutionally endorsed interests in their interpretation of the fetal
right to life as prohibiting the assistance in the destruction of the fetus.
99 Shimp, supra note 98 at 14-15.
100 The Irish Constitution, 2d ed. (Dublin: Jurist Publishing, 1984) at 299.
101 See The People (at the Suit of the Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Shaw, [1982] L.R. 1
(S.C.), where the right to life was held to prevail over the right to liberty.
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The constitutional rights of bodily integrity,102 equality,103 privacy,104 and
freedom of expressionlOS were all relevant to the issue before the courts.
However, these rights were barely mentioned and, when they were, they
were subordinated to the fetal right to life without any substantial
consideration of why they should be so subordinated. James Friedman
has argued that the courts were wrong in Open Door to subordinate
freedom of expression, protected by Article 40(6)(1), to the right to life
of the unborn. He suggests that as freedom of expression is a value
fundamental to democracies, it should have been considered as
qualifying the fetal right to life. Friedman argues that freedom of
expression is a fundamental democratic value in facilitating challenge to
the status quo and "a healthy scepticism that we have not yet created the
best of all possible worlds."1 06
In Open Door, Hamilton P., without providing an explanation for
his conclusion, said:
The qualified right to privacy, the rights of association and freedom of expression and the
right to disseminate information cannot be invoked to interfere with such a fundamental
102 In Ryan v. The Attorney General, [1965] I.R. 294 at 312, the Supreme Court affirmed Kenny
J.'s finding in the High Court that there was a right to bodily integrity, which he held was one of a
residue of personal rights contemplated by Article 40(3)(1) which provides: "The State guarantees
in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal
rights of the citizen."
103 While the Irish Constitution does explicitly recognize a right to equality in Article 40(1), its
limitations are obvious: "All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law. This
shall not be held to mean that the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to differences of
capacity, physical and moral, and of social function." Fox and Murphy comment that formulations
of abortion as an equality right might not work in an Irish context given that "the equality guarantee
in the constitution has suffered from under-use": see M. Fox & T. Murphy, "Irish Abortion: Seeking
Refuge in a Jurisprudence of Doubt and Delegation" (1992) 19 J. L. & Soc'y 454 at 462.
104 In McGee, supra note 16, a right to marital privacy was recognized. In Norris v. Attorney
General, [1984] I.R. 36, the Supreme Court implicitly accepted that the plaintiff had an individual
right to privacy.
105 Article 40(6)(1) provides: The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following
rights, subject to public order and morality:
(i) The rights of the citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions. The
education of public opinion being, however, a matter of such grave import to the
common good, the State shall endeavour to ensure that organs of public opinion, such as
the radio, the press, the cinema, while preserving their rightful liberty of expression,
including criticism of Government policy, shall not be used to undermine public order or
morality or the authority of the State. The publication or utterance of blasphemous,
seditious, or indecent matter is an offence which shall be punishable in accordance with
law.
106 Supra note 84 at 78.
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right as the right to life of the unborn, which is acknowledged by the Constitution of
Ireland. 1 0 7
In the Supreme Court Finlay C.J. reiterated the above stating: "I am
satisfied that no right could constitutionally arise to obtain information
the purpose of the obtaining of which was to defeat the constitutional
right to life of the unborn child."108 It is interesting to note that, in a
different context, Hamilton P. was much less inclined to play down the
significance of the right to privacy. In Kennedy andArnold v. Ireland and
theAttorney General, he said:
The nature of the right to privacy must be such as to ensure the dignity and freedom of an
individual in the type of society envisaged by the Constitution, namely, a sovereign,
independent and democratic society. The dignity and freedom of an individual in a
democratic society cannot be ensured if his communications of a private nature, be they
written or telephonic, are deliberately, consciously and unjustifiably intruded upon and
interfered with. 109
Feminists are entitled to ask why women's "dignity and freedom" as
individuals in a democratic society did not stop the court from intruding
on and interfering with their "communications of a private nature" in
the context of abortion information. The explanation is that the courts'
fundamentalist approach meant that they compromised other
constitutional interests in order to absolutely protect the fetal right to
life. The courts never even got to the point of weighing constitutional
concerns against each other. Rather, they dismissed the relevance of any
concern other than the right to life of the "unborn." The extremity of
their approach indicates how the processes of judicial interpretation
were informed by the fundamentalist abortion narrative at work in Irish
society.
The Courts supported their defence of the right to life of the
"unborn" despite the absence of a particular fetus in the courtroom by
reference to the public interest in the protection of fetal life. They relied
on this public interest to justify the order for injunctions prohibiting the
distribution of abortion information. For example, in Coogan, Walsh J.
said, "What is in issue in this case is the defence of the public interest in
the preservation of that private right which has been guaranteed by the
107 Open Door, supra note 11 at 617.
108 Ibid. at 625.
109 [1987] I.R. 587 at 593 (S.C.). This case concerned the plaintiffs' successful claim for
damages on the grounds that their constitutional rights had been violated by the unjustified tapping
of their telephone conversations pursuant to a warrant issued by the minister of justice.
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Constitution."11o The inability of the fetus to assert independently its
private rights contributed to the courts' recognition of a public interest
in protecting the fetal right. But if there is a public interest in fetal life
there is also a public interest in women's life, an interest which also
entails protecting women's health and welfare. As Walsh J. also said in
G. v. An Bord Uchtala and Others,11' the right to life is composed of
quality of life interests as well as those of biological existence: "The right
to life necessarily implies the right to be born, the right to preserve and
defend (and to have preserved and defended) that life, and the right to
maintain that life at a proper human standard in matters of food,
clothing and habitation." However, the courts ignored the possibility
that a public interest in women's lives, health, and welfare might justify
the provision of abortion information. When women's health was raised
as a possible justification for not restraining pregnancy counselling
services in Open Door, Finlay C.J. dismissed it out of hand:
It was strenously submitted on behalf of the defendants that if they did not provide this
counselling service and, in particular, did not provide the identification, name and
address of and method of communication with a properly run clinic the probability was
that in many or all cases the pregnant woman concerned, who had decided upon the
option of abortion, would succeed in obtaining an abortion in England, and probably in
circumstances less advantageous to her health. No evidence was adduced to support this
contention. There are no grounds for inferring it from any of the facts which are agreed
as the basis for the trial of the action.
Even if it could be established, however, it would not be a valid reason why the Courts
should not restrain the activities in which the defendants were engaged ....
I am satisfied, therefore, that it is no answer to the making of an order restraining these
defendants' activities that there may be other persons or the activities of other groups or
bodies which will provide the same result as that assisted by these defendants'
activities.112
At one level, the failure to accommodate women's health as a
relevant interest is further evidence of the claim that women's rights
were absolutely subordinated to the fetal right to life. Even if the
evidence before the court did not support an empirical argument that
women's health justified refusing to restrain the defendants' activities, a
normative health-based argument could have. Women's health is a
value to which the Court should properly have had regard, perhaps
through reference to the right to bodily integrity, in determining the
degree of protection that the fetal right to life merited. But the chief
110 Coogan, supra note 11 at 743.
111 [1980] I.R. 52 (S.C.) at 69. "An Bord Uchtala" means the Adoption Board.
112 Open Door, supra note 11 at 624 [emphasis added].
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justice was of the view that even if harm to women's health as a result of
the injunctions could be established it was not a "valid reason" to refuse
to restrain the defendants' activities.
At another level, the Supreme Court demonstrated here a lack
of concern for the probable effects that their interpretation would have
on both the rate of abortion and women's health. Given that women
were travelling in the thousands to avail of abortion services abroad, the
Court was aware that the injunction was unlikely to do much in
stemming the "destruction" of fetal life. The judges also should have
been aware that by making it more difficult for women to find out about
safe and legal abortion services abroad they were increasing the risk to
women's health, since women would be more likely to present for
abortion later in their pregnancies,113 and possibly to less reputable
services. In denying that the possible ineffectiveness of the order should
constrain their decision, the Court favoured a policy of adhering to a
literal interpretation of the fetal right in question over a more purposive
approach that would take into account the effects of the order on the
legal interests in question. While granting the order allowed the Court
to be seen to be protecting fetal life, it actually would have little effect in
protecting that life, and would make matters worse by making abortions
at a later stage in pregnancy more likely. Their adherence to a literal
approach and their desire to be seen to be taking a stand against the
distribution of abortion information allowed the Court to erase women's
health as a valid concern. In answering, or avoiding, the defendants'
argument about women's health with the claim that ineffectiveness of
the order was not a justification for refusing it, the Court left women's
health out of the constitutional picture.
In Coogan, Walsh J. commented:
One of the fundamental political rights of the citizen under the Constitution, indeed one
of the most valued of his rights, is that of access to the courts. The life most directly
affected in these cases is the unborn life and that is the very one which cannot directly
assert this right in court.1 14
Apart from implying that we should consider the "unborn" as a citizen,
Walsh J. was clearly of the view that the pregnant woman is less affected
by the provision of abortion information than the fetus. While the
implications of a woman's constitutionally endorsed rights of privacy,
equality, free expression, and bodily integrity are judicially ignored, no
chance is lost to assert other legal rights on behalf of the fetus, such as
1 13 See Conlon, supra note 20.
1 1 4 Coogan, supra note 11 at 744.
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the right of access to the courts, in order to consolidate the
constitutional prioritization of fetal life. To the extent that a woman's
rights are considered in this jurisprudence, the fetus still assumes centre
stage, as this obiter dicta of Walsh J. in Grogan demonstrates:
When a woman becomes pregnant she acquires rights which cannot be taken from her,
namely the right to protect the life of her unborn child and the right to protect her own
bodily integrity against any effort to compel her by law or by persuasion to submit herself
to an abortion. Such rights also carry obligations the foremost of which is not to endanger
or to submit to or bring about the destruction of that unborn life./15
Thus, a pregnant woman's rights and responsibilities are defined by
reference to her pregnancy. A pregnant woman is no longer considered
as a woman but as a pregnancy. Furthermore, Walsh J. made these
comments about the obligations imposed on a woman by pregnancy even
though he ostensibly refused to consider how her "equal right to life"
qualifies the fetal right to life. He suggested that the pregnant woman is
obliged not to endanger the fetus without appreciating that he was
commenting on how conflicts of rights between woman and fetus should
be resolved. If a pregnant woman cannot do anything that might harm
the fetus then effectively her rights are suspended for the duration of the
pregnancy. Not only did he implicitly render the woman's equal right to
life devoid of substance, he further obliged her not to endanger the
fetus. This could severely restrict a woman's freedom during pregnancy
as behaviour as ordinary as travelling in a car, for example, could be
interpreted as endangering a fetus.
In Open Door, Hamilton P. was of the view that the relevant
statute law afforded the fetal right to life statutory protection from the
date of its conception.1 16 However, he justified this assumption simply
by reference to sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act
1861.117 He inferred that since the 1861 statute no longer referred to the
woman as being "quick with child," as the 1803 statute118 had, this meant
that the protection of the fetus in the womb dates from conception and
not from quickening. He failed to take into consideration that the 1861
Act could be interpreted as making abortion lawful in certain
circumstances, and he failed to explain why conception, as distinct from
viability, or birth, should be the relevant criterion for assessing when an
abortion was an unlawful abortion. The general failure of the courts to
115 Grogan, supra note 11 at 767.
116 Open Door, supra note 11 at 598.
1 1 7 Supra note 66.
118 (U.K.), 43 Geo. III, c. 58.
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clarify their interpretation of the "unborn" when enforcing its right to
life, and this particular reference to conception as the point from which
protection begins is further evidence of their absolutist approach. The
courts interpreted the right to life of the "unborn" as if it could limit
other constitutional rights at any stage of pregnancy, a position which
could also have implications for the legal use of some forms of
contraception.
The judicial failure to entertain the possibility that abortion was
lawful in any circumstances should have been avoided by an analysis of
the relevant statute law. The relevant statutory provisions on abortion"19
are sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which
provide:
58. Every woman, being with child, who, with intent to procure her own miscarriage,
shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing, or shall
unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, and
whosoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she be or not
be with child, shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be taken by her any poison or
other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever
with like intent, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable ... to
be kept in penal servitude....
59. Whosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any poison or other noxious thing, or
any instrument or thing whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be unlawfully
used or employed with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she be
or be not, with child, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall
be liable ... [to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years].1
2 0
Section 10 of the Health (Family Planning) Act 1979,121 provides:
"Nothing in this act shall be construed as authorizing (a) the procuring
of an abortion, (b) the doing of any other thing the doing of which is
prohibited by section 58 or 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861
... " As a matter of statutory interpretation, section 58's prohibition of
unlawful abortions implies that abortion may be lawful. 122 As there is no
direct Irish authority on the issue, an Irish court would consider a
relevant decision of another common law jurisdiction in determining the
119 For a review of the historical development of the criminal prohibition of abortion, see
Shelley Gavigan, "The Criminal Sanction as it Relates to Human Reproduction: The Genesis of
The Statutory Prohibition of Abortion" (1984) 5 J. Legal Hist. 20. See also J. Keown, Abortion,
Doctors and the Law: Some Aspects of the Legal Regulation of Abortion in England from 1803 to 1982
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
1 2 0 Supra note 66.
121 Supra note 74.
122 See M.J. Findlay, "Criminal Liability for Complicity in Abortions Committed Outside
Ireland" (1980) Irish Jurist 88 at 89; and the Constitution Review Group, supra note 5 at 276.
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significance of "unlawfully." In Boume,123 Macnaghten J. interpreted
section 58 as making unlawful those abortions which were not done in
good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the pregnant
woman. He also determined that an abortion performed on the grounds
that the pregnancy was likely to make the woman a "physical or mental
wreck," was performed for the purpose of preserving her life. This case
concerned the prosecution of a doctor under the 1861 Act who had
performed an abortion on the fourteen year old survivor of a gang rape.
Macnaghten J. was of the opinion that "unlawfully" was not "a
meaningless word," 124 and thought it imported the meaning expressed in
the proviso of section 1(1) of the U.K. Infant Life (Preservation) Act
1929,125 which provided that "no person shall be found guilty of an
offence under this section unless it is proved that the act which caused
the death of the child was not done in good faith for the purpose only of
preserving the life of the mother."
If Macnaghten J.'s interpretation of the word unlawfully was
dependent on the 1929 Act, then this interpretation would probably not
be accepted as informing Irish law given that the 1929 Act does not form
part of Irish law. However, it has been argued that this is not the case,
and that, at a minimum, terminations of pregnancy performed in cases
of cancer of the uterus and ectopic pregnancy are lawful abortions under
the application of the 1861 Act in Ireland.126 Macnaghten J.'s attribution
of importance to the word "unlawfully" in section 58 was independent of
the provisions of the 1929 Act, and he used the proviso of section 1 of
that Act because he believed it expressed a meaning that was compatible
with section 58, not necessarily definitive of it. Also, as Noel Whitty
comments:
This inappropriate reliance on the proviso in the 1929 Act resulted from the belief that
there was no other legal authority on the meaning of "unlawfully." In fact, there was
textbook and judicial authority available that demonstrated that therapeutic abortion to
protect the woman's life and health was both lawful and common medical practice in
England well before 1938.127
However, the possibility of abortion being lawful was simply not
entertained in the first cases to be litigated on Article 40(3)(3): Open
Door, Grogan, and Coogan.
12 3 Supra note 66.
124 Ibid. at 691.
125 (U.K.), 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34.
126 See Whitty, supra note 4 at 862.
12 7 1bid. at 858.
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In its construction of the constitutional right to life of the
"unborn" as justifying the restriction of women's right to access
information about abortion services, the Supreme Court assumed that,
rather than explained why, fetal life merits this degree of protection.
There was no substantive discussion of what it means to vindicate the
right to life of the "unborn," no regard for the context of pregnancy in
considering the "as far as practicable" limitation, and no consideration
of women's interests by reference to "the equal right to life of the
mother." The legal consequences of defending a fetal right to life are
not as self-evident as the Court appears to have assumed. Determining
how to vindicate a right to life in any particular situation requires
consideration of the facts and values raised by that situation.
Determining how to defend a fetal right to life requires accommodation
of the fact of pregnancy and the values of women's rights to life,
equality, and freedom. There is nothing about Article 40(3)(3) which
precludes such consideration as the Supreme Court assumed. The
failure of the Supreme Court to engage in such consideration is
therefore significant. It indicates that doctrinal interpretation cannot be
the only explanation for the Court's ascription of superior value to the
fetal right to life. In interpreting Article 40(3)(3) as prohibiting
"assistance" in the destruction of the fetus the Court assumed that any
potential interference with the fetal right to life was never justified. This
degree of prioritization of fetal life over other constitutionally endorsed
values indicates a tendency towards absolutism. The fact that the judges
understood the issues as requiring the prioritization of the value of fetal
life to this extent, without feeling that they had to provide an
explanation, suggests that the relevant issues were framed through a
fundamentalist abortion narrative.
B. SPUC as the Guardian of the Public Interest in Fetal Life
When the courts permitted sPuc to act in the capacity of the
attorney general's relator, and later to bring an action to prevent the
violation of fetal life in its own name, they interpreted the fetal right to
life as an abstract value whose enforcement was so significant that it did
not require the presence of an actual woman or fetus whose legal
interests were being compromised. The appeal courts denied the
significance of a concrete factual context of pregnancy for the
interpretation of law in order to allow themselves to assert the fetal right
to life in the broadest terms possible. Given that appellate courts do not
deal with points of fact, but with points of law, they are usually required
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to exhibit restraint in limiting their legal findings to the facts of the case
before them. However, the Irish courts chose to interpret the fetal right
to life in general terms that constrained the distribution of information
about abortion services without the benefit of assessing how a particular
factual context of pregnancy affects the legal interests raised. In Open
Door, the defendant pregnancy counselling centres challenged the
plaintiff attorney general's standing in the proceedings on the grounds
that
the action did not concern any specific pregnant woman and her unborn child and by
reason of that fact it was alleged that the Court should in its discretion refuse to grant any
relief to the Attorney General because by doing so it might affect the position of the
mother of an unborn child who had not been heard. 128
Generally, as a matter of law, applicants for a particular legal remedy
must establish to the satisfaction of the court that they have standing in
the matter by reason of their interest in the proceedings.129 However,
both the High Court and the Supreme Court dismissed this objection,
contending that the attorney general was a particularly appropriate
person to invoke the court's jurisdiction in this matter.
Furthermore, the courts held that when the attorney general sues
with a relator,130 in this case sPuc, the relator need have no personal
interest in the subject except his or her interest as a member of the
public. In the High Court, Hamilton P. commented that if the
defendants were acting unlawfully it was
in the public interest and the interest of the common good that they be restrained from so
doing ... [and that] the public interests are committed to the care of the Attorney
General. He is entitled to sue to restrain the commission of an unlawful act, to protect
and vindicate a right acknowledged by the Constitution and to prevent the corruption of
public morals. 13 1
On appeal, Finlay C.J. said:
128 Open Door, supra note 11 at 621-22. Although spuc had initially issued proceedings
against the defendants, they subsequently obtained leave to amend the proceedings which were
converted into proceedings in the name of the attorney general at the relation of the Society.
129 Under Irish law, the requirement of standing for litigants in cases involving challenges to
the validity of statutes on constitutional grounds is more demanding than in cases where a
constitutional guarantee is invoked independent of any statutory provision: see Cahill v. Sutton,
[1980] I.R. 275 (S.C.).
130 On the relator procedure see M. Forde, Constitutional Law of Ireland (Cork: Mercier
Press, 1987) at 65-66.
131 Open Door, supra note 11 at 603-04.
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If, therefore, the jurisdiction of the courts is invoked by a party who has a bona fide
concern and interest for the protection of the constitutionally guaranteed right to life of
the unborn, the courts, as the judicial organ of government of the State, would be failing
in their duty as far as practicable to vindicate and defend that right if they were to refuse
relief upon the grounds that no particular pregnant woman who might be affected by the
making of an order was represented before the courts.
I am satisfied that the Attorney General, who is the holder of a high constitutional office,
is an especially appropriate person to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court in order to
vindicate and defend the right to which I have referred. 132
These comments are informed by the assumption that all pregnancies
are the same, so that the legal interests which they raise will also be the
same. By invoking a generalized right to life of the "unborn," the courts
denied the significance of the personal and social particulars of
pregnancy. This generalized fetal right to life then allowed the judiciary
to interpret almost anyone as an appropriate party to invoke it. The
general application of this right meant that the relevant party was not
required to have any particular characteristics in order to be able to
assert the right before the court. The courts' need to generalize the fetal
right to life in order to find that the attorney general, or spuc as relator,
were appropriate parties to seek its protection, meant that the courts
broadened the interpretation of standing requirements,133 and that they
downplayed the crucial role of facts in the interpretation of law.
In the second case to arise under Article 40(3)(3), Coogan, spuc
took the role of defending the fetal right to life on itself. At this point
spuc, a fundamentalist "pro-life" group, became legally construed as the
defender of the generalized fetal right to life. In the High Court, Carroll
J. declined to grant the injunction requested on the grounds that the
plaintiff lacked the standing reserved to the attorney general to seek
undertakings and injunctions to restrain threatened breaches of the
Constitution. She said, "[t]he plaintiff has assumed the self-appointed
role of policing the Supreme Court judgment [in Open Door]. In my
opinion, it has no right to seek undertakings from citizens and it is the
Attorney General who is the proper party to move in such a case."134
However, the Supreme Court overruled her decision on the grounds that
any party who had a bona fide concern and interest in the protection of
the constitutionally guaranteed right to life of the "unborn" had
132 Ibid. at 623.
133 See also R. Humphreys & T. O'Dowd, "Locus Standi to Enforce the Constitution: SPUC
v. Coogan" (1990) 8 Irish Law Times 14; and H. Delany, "Recent Developments in Locus Standi in
Irish Constitutional Law" (1990) 8 Irish Law Times 147.
134 Coogan, supra note 11 at 737.
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sufficient standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts to take such
measures as would defend and vindicate that right. Finlay C.J. gave the
judgment with which a majority of the court agreed (Griffin, Walsh and
Hederman JJ.; McCarthy J. dissenting). He was of the view that to
accept that "only the Attorney General could sue to protect such a
constitutional right as that involved in this case ... would, I am satisfied,
be a major curtailment of the duty and the power of the courts to defend
and uphold the Constitution."1 35
Finlay C.J. justified this view on the grounds that that there
could never be a victim or potential victim who can sue in respect of a
violation of the constitutional right to life of the "unborn." The fact that
a fetus whose right to life had been violated could not take an action
does not in itself justify allowing sPuc to act to prevent the violation of
fetal rights. While the terms of the plaintiff's articles and memorandum
of association were not sufficient in themselves to give standing, Finlay
C.J. thought it significant that "there can be no question of the plaintiff
being an officious meddlesome intervenient in this matter."136 Clearly,
the chief justice's desire to grant sPuc standing prevented him from
identifying the plaintiffs' efforts at preventing the distribution of
abortion information to pregnant women as "meddling" in the affairs of
those women. It is doubtful that the women whose search for
information about safe and legal abortion services abroad has been
made more difficult by the likes of sPuc, or the pregnancy counselling
centres or student unions who sought to aid them, would agree with the
chief justice. Furthermore, he considered:
The part, however, that the plaintiff has taken in the proceedings to which I have referred
[Open Doo], which were successfully brought to conclusion by the Attorney General at
its relation, and the particular right which it seeks to protect with its importance to the whole
nature of our society, constitute sufficient grounds for holding that it is a person with a
bonafide concern and interest and accordingly has the necessary legal standing to bring
the action.1 3 7
In his concurring opinion Walsh J. said:
The question in issue in the present case is not one of a public right in the classical sense
... but is a very unique private right and a human right which there is a public interest in
preserving .... What is in issue in this case is the defence of the public interest in the
preservation of that private right which has been guaranteed by the Constitution. 13 8
13 5 Ibid. at 742.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid. [emphasis added].
138 Ibid. at 743 [emphasis added].
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The general importance of the fetal right to life to the nature of
Irish society and the role that sPuc had played in one case in defending
that right were sufficient in the eyes of the chief justice and a majority of
the Court to grant spuc standing to enforce the Constitution. By
constructing sPuc as guardians of the public interest in fetal life, these
judges conflated that public interest with the private interest of a
fundamentalist group. Walsh J. commented:
The attitude of the defendants to this case has not been unconcealed. They boldly assert
that no one but the Attorney General could seek to prevent them from engaging in the
impugned activities and, in the absence of such intervention, the courts and the citizens in
general must remain powerless to prevent activities designed not merely to evade the
constitutional rights but totally to destroy them. Their expressions of indignation at being
asked by the plaintiff before being sued to give an undertaking to cease the activities
complained of cannot be seriously accepted.13 9
Here we can see how Walsh J. interpreted spuc's intervention in seeking
the enforcement of the fetal right to life as an action taken on behalf of
the "courts and the citizens." He implied that if spuc had not initiated
this case the public interest would have gone undefended, a situation
that he found to be intolerable. sPuc's intentions were presumed to be
innocent while the student unions were criticized for daring to assume
that seuc had no right in law to ask them to desist from behaviour which
spuc found offensive. Walsh J. commented further:
In the present case the plaintiff has, in my opinion, shown a genuine interest in the
protection of unborn life and it was reasonable on its part to raise the issue as
representing the interest of unborn lives. To seek the vindication of the right to life of
the unborn is a right which does not rest exclusively with any public authority or office of
state and may on occasion even depend solely upon the vigilance of the citizen. 1 4 0
While spuc's role in the proceedings was justified in terms of its
"genuine interest" in the protection of "unborn" life, the student unions
genuine interest in serving the needs of pregnant women merited no
consideration. The construction of the vindication of the fetal right to
life as occasionally depending on the "vigilance of the citizen" suggested
that it is justifiable to subject pregnant women to surveillance in the
interests of preventing the possible violation of fetal life. In his dissent
from the majority of the court McCarthy J. commented:
If, as submitted on behalf of the Society, the whole nature and quality of Irish society is
affected by the right, it would appear to be a public right, ordinarily in the province of the
Attorney General....
13 9 Coogan, supra 11 at 743 [emphasis added].
140 Ibid. at 747.
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In my view, it is the Attorney General, and he alone, who can in such a case validly
pursue that claim to protect the right of the unborn to judgment ... In my view, the
Society is in no better or worse aposition than any other prospective litigant. I confess to
a feeling of great unease at the prospect of any person or group of persons, howeverwell
intentioned, being held at law competent to maintain an action of this kind without the
intervention of the Attorney General, despite his offer of assistance. Of far greater
import is the claim by the Society, as a preliminary to such action, to demand and receive
an undertaking from a citizen or a group of citizens as to their future conduct. The
implications to a free societyof such a claim are alarming.141
By constructing the fetal right to life as a general public interest and
spuc as an appropriate defender of that interest, a majority of the
Supreme Court judges were content to allow Irish law to be used
towards fundamentalist ends.
C. European Community Law
The defendants in Open Door and in Grogan argued that
women's access to abortion information was protected by EC law if not by
domestic law. The defendants sought to resist the fundamentalist
construction of the fetal right to life in the national courts by appealing
to the legal protection of women's interests afforded by a supranational
legal order. However, with the exception of Carroll J. in the High Court
in Grogan, the Irish courts denied the relevance of Community law by
interpreting the issue before them as a domestic, Irish matter concerning
practices within the Irish state. In so doing, they strayed from their more
usual policy of following the rule that where EC law applies it takes
precedence. Usually the fact that the cases before the courts involved
transborder issues would mean that the courts would consider the
application of Community law. On the issue of abortion, however, the
courts constructed the issues before them in such a way as to isolate Irish
domestic law from the effects of EC law's application to Ireland.
In Open Door, Hamilton P. was of the view that he did not have
to consider the application of the provisions of EC law because the
activities of the defendants occurred within the state. He refused to
refer a question to the European Court of Justice (Eel) under Article
177142 for a preliminary ruling as to whether the defendants had the
141 Ibid. at 751.
142 Article 177 of the EL-c Treaty, supra note 82 provides:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the
interpretation of the Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions
of the Community; (c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of
the Council, where those statutes so provide.
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right to provide information about services provided in another member
state. The defendant pregnancy counselling services argued that such a
right derived from the protection of freedom to provide services under
Articles 59 and 60 of the European Economic Community (EEc)
Treaty.143 On appeal the Supreme Court also refused to make a
reference for a preliminary ruling. The Court did so on the grounds that
what was being restrained was assistance to pregnant women to travel
abroad. Therefore, the Court was of the view that no question of
interpretation of Community law fell to be decided for the purpose of
determining the issue between the parties.
In Grogan, the Supreme Court overturned Carroll J.'s decision
not to grant spuc an injunction stopping the officers of the student
unions from distributing abortion information. Finlay C.J. (with whom
Griffin J., Hederman J. and Walsh J. agreed, the latter giving a separate
opinion) was of the view that, given that the right sought to be protected
was the right to life, there was no question of a possible right that might
exist in EC law as a corollary to a right to travel so as to avail of services
counterbalancing the necessity for an interlocutory injunction. The
judiciary, in its eagerness to promote protection of the right to life of the
"unborn," was zealous in asserting the primacy of national law in this
context, without acknowledging that the general rule is that where
Community law applies, it takes precedence. The chief justice asserted
that there is "no question" of a possible right to abortion information
under EC law that might limit the application of the fetal right to life,
without providing any reasonable explanation as to why this should be
so. The assumption is that the right to life of the "unborn" is such an
important national concern that any possible right to abortion
information under EC law could not limit it. Not only did the Court
refuse to weigh this right under EC law against the fetal right to life, it
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that
court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable
it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a
Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law,
that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
143 The founding treaties of what was the EC (and is now the Eu) are: the Treaty Establishing
the European Coal and Steel Community, 18 April 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; the L.:C Treaty, supra note
82; and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 25 March 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 167. These Treaties have been amended by the Single European Act, 1986, 29 June 1997,
O.J. L169, and the Maastricht Treaty, supra note 14.
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denied the very existence of such a rightj 44 The Court poured scorn on
the very idea that rights under EC law could be a relevant concern for the
interpretation of Article 40(3)(3) in order to justify its refusal to seek a
ruling from the ECJ, the ultimate authority on EC jurisprudence, on the
matter. Walsh J. commented:
The decision of this Court in the action brought by the present plaintiff in [Open Door]
has given an interpretation to the 8th Amendment which is not open to question in any
court in this State or in any other state or in any international court. The interpretation
of the Constitution of Ireland is within the exclusive competence of the courts of
Ireland. 1 4 5
Walsh J. neglected to recognize that the very Constitution of which he
speaks acknowledges that its provisions should not prevent the
application of EC law in the Irish state. In order to allow the State to
become a member of the EC and to recognize the force of EC law in
Ireland, Article 29(4)(3) was inserted into the Irish Constitution in 1972.
It provides:
The State may become a member of the European Coal and Steel Community, the
European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. No
provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by
the State necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Communities or prevents
laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the Communities, or institutions thereof,
from having the force of law in the State.
Given the direct applicability of Community legislation and the authority
of the ECJ in interpreting matters of Community law, this Amendment
was necessary to avoid contradicting constitutional recognition of the
exclusive legislative power of the Oireachtas (Article(15)(2)), the
exclusive role of the courts in the administration of justice (Article
34(1)) and the finality of the decisions of the Supreme Court (Article 34
(4)(6)). The principle governing interpretation of matters on which
Community law and national law conflict is that where Community law is
relevant to the determination of proceedings it takes precedence over
domestic law. The ECJ has been unequivocal in this position and the
144 In Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v. Grogan [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849, the ECJ
held that abortion was a service regulated under Ec law but that the student unions were not
protected by EC law because they were not in an economic relationship with the service providers.
As a result, the High Court granted the order issuing a permanent injunction against the student
unions: Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan and Others, [1994] 1
I.R. 46. But on appeal in 1997 the Supreme Court declined to affirm the order on the grounds that
the defendants' activities were not necessarily unlawful under the law as it now stood: Grogan 1997,
supra note 83.
145 Grogan, supra note 11 at 766.
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Irish judiciary also appear to have accepted this view. 146 While
derogation from the fundamental principles of Community law-the
free movement of goods, persons and services-is permitted on grounds
of public interest, such derogation is generally strictly construed and
must be necessary and proportionate to an objective which is justified
under Community law.
As Madeleine Reid notes, the Irish courts have generally been
receptive to Community law: "It is quite clear that Irish jurisprudence at
all levels accepts the effect of the amendment [Article 29(4)(3)] as giving
Community law, within the sphere of effect which it itself defines,
superior force to the provisions of the Constitution."147 In Campus Oil
Ltd. v. Minister for Industry and Energy, 48 the Supreme Court went so far
as to suggest that the Treaty of Rome was incorporated by reference into
the constitutional order and that the Treaty may be invoked to qualify
the language of the Constitution itself. Walsh J. said that, by virtue of
Article 29(4)(3), "the right of appeal to [the Supreme] Court ... must
yield to the primacy of article 177 of the Treaty. That article, as part of
Irish law, qualifies Article 34 of the Constitution in the matter in
question,"1 49 a view which one commentator has referred to as "plus
royaliste que le roi,"so given that the European Court has indicated that
it regards this question as a procedural matter for the national courts to
decide. The denial of the relevance of EC law with regard to the
interpretation of Article 40(3)(3) was clearly inconsistent with the
courts' established pattern of welcoming the application of EC law to
Irish jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court made a distinction in Open Door between
"assistance," as making available the identity and location of, and
method of communication with, a specified abortion clinic; and
"information," as knowing about the existence of abortion outside the
jurisdiction. Even if the provision of specific information may be
146 See M. Reid, The Impact of Community Law on the Irish Constitution (Dublin: Irish Centre
for European Law, 1990) at 9-16.
147 Ibid. at 7.
148 [1983] I.R. 82 [hereinafter Campus Oil]. This case was concerned with the question of
whether an appeal lay to the Supreme Court against a decision of the High Court to refer a question
of Community law for a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice. The Supreme Court
ruled that no such appeal did lie as this would run counter to the spirit and purpose of Article 177 of
the Treaty of Rome.
149 Ibid. at 87.
150 D. O'Keefe, "Appeals Against an Order to Refer Under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty"
(1984) 9 Eur. L. Rev. 87 at 97.
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construed as assistance in procuring an abortion, the mere fact that it is
"assistance" does not stop it from also being "information." The
categorization of the provision of abortion information as assistance
should not relieve the courts of the responsibility of also addressing its
legal status as information about services legally provided in other states.
Legal categories do not have to be interpreted as exclusive. However,
the Court's categorization of the provision of the names, addresses, and
phone numbers of abortion clinics, as assistance functioned in order to
allow the Court to exclude the question of information from its
consideration. The Court made this questionable distinction in order to
argue that Community law was not relevant to the issue of assistance
within the jurisdiction which, it determined, was before the Court. The
judicial eagerness to defend the public interest in fetal life as a national
and cultural issue informed their interpretation of the issues so as to
exclude EC law from the picture. In so defending, the Irish courts
adopted an isolationist-fundamentalist approach to abortion law,
V. CLOSING THE FUNDAMENTALIST
NARRATIVE: THE X CASE
In the process of vindicating the constitutional right to life of the
"unborn," the Irish Supreme Court had, by 1992, issued injunctions
against pregnancy counselling centres and student unions to stop them
from providing pregnant women with abortion information in Open
Door and Grogan. The Court had also declared that a fundamentalist
anti-abortion group, spuc, had standing to seek the prevention of an
alleged breach of the fetal right to life in Coogan. In making these
decisions, the Supreme Court denied the relevance of qualifications on
the fetal right to life, women's constitutional rights, and EC law. Through
constitutionalization, the right to life of the "unborn" had been legally
recognized as an important interest of Irish society. Now, through the
judicial interpretation of Article 40(3)(3), that right had acquired a
status that rendered it more important to Irish society than other
constitutionally endorsed interests. The fundamentalist representation
of the fetal right to life as an absolute interest had been translated into
law, given its higher constitutional status, its application to all Irish
people without differentiation, and its demand that positive action be
taken to enforce the legal protection of fetal life.
In February 1992, state endorsement of the fundamentalist
prioritization of fetal life reached a dramatic climax in the X case. On
the understanding that Irish law required the state to prevent the
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destruction of fetal life, the attorney general sought, and the High Court
granted, an injunction stopping a young pregnant rape victim from
travelling to England to terminate her pregnancy. The X case provoked
an unprecedented public outcry as thousands took to the streets to
protest this victimization of a suicidal fourteen-year-old girl.151 The
violation of women's rights through the prioritization of fetal life became
tangible for the Irish public as it took shape in Irish law's victimization of
a particular young woman. On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned
the High Court ruling, holding that Article 40(3)(3)'s recognition of the
mother's equal right to life envisaged a right to abortion where the
mother's life was at risk. A case that had begun as a challenge to a
young woman's right to travel to England for an abortion ended up
validating her right to abortion in Ireland.
The X case unfolded after X and her parents had decided to
travel to England in order that X terminate her pregnancy. X's parents
were anxious that the prosecution of the man responsible for the rape
proceed and that, if possible, X be spared the trauma of giving evidence.
They contacted the Gardaf (police) to ask whether scientific DNA tests
performed on the aborted fetus in order to establish biological paternity
would be admissible in court. The Gardaf sought a legal opinion in this
regard from the director of public prosecutions, and in the process the
attorney general was informed of the case. The attorney general then
sought and obtained an interim injunction in the High Court restraining
the young woman and her parents from interfering with the right to life
of the "unborn," restraining them from leaving the jurisdiction for nine
months and restraining them from procuring or arranging an abortion
within or outside the jurisdiction. On hearing of the injunction, X and
her parents returned home from England in order to contest the motion
for an interlocutory injunction. They did so on the grounds that they
had a right to travel from the jurisdiction to do what was lawful
elsewhere, that the mother's right to life was itself in peril, and that such
injunctions were unprecedented and ought not to have been granted. By
consent the motion was treated as the full trial.
151 See The Irish Times (22 February 1992), available on the Internet at http://www.irish-
times.com. During the two weeks between the issuing of the interim injunction by the High Court
and the lifting of the interlocutory injunction by the Supreme Court, there were large protests
outside Dail Eireann almost everyday. On the Saturday after the High Court issued the permanent
interlocutory injunction, ten thousand people marched through Dublin on a pro-choice protest,
which was unprecedented in Irish society. Pro-choice groups such as the Dublin Abortion
Information Campaign, Repeal the Eighth Amendment Campaign, and the Women's Coalition
were involved in the organizing of such events.
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Costello J., in the High Court, granted the interlocutory
injunction on the grounds that the court had a duty under Article
40(3)(3) to defend and vindicate the right to life of the "unborn." He
was of the view that the risk that the young woman might take her own
life if the injunction was granted was of a lesser and different order of
magnitude than the otherwise certain death of the "unborn" if the
injunction was not granted. The news of the High Court injunction was
greeted with consternation on the part of the Irish public and, as protest
mounted, the Government responded to the pressure by making the
unprecedented move of offering to fund X's appeal to the Supreme
Court. On appeal the Supreme Court (Finlay C.J., McCarthy J.,
O'Flaherty J. and Egan J.; Hederman J. dissenting) allowed the appeal
and discharged the injunctions. The Court held that the true
interpretation of Article 40(3)(3) of the Constitution required that
termination of pregnancy was permissible only when it was established as
a matter of probability that there was a real and substantial risk to the
life of the mother if such termination were not effected. To prevent
termination except in circumstances where there was a risk of immediate
or inevitable death of the mother did not sufficiently vindicate the right
to life of the mother. The risks to the life of the mother that should have
been considered by the Court included a real and substantial risk of
suicide.
Hederman J. dissented on the ground that the evidence in the
instant case fell short of the standard required to justify a termination of
pregnancy. He felt that it was not established on the basis of medical
evidence that there was no other conclusion but that the consequences
of the continuance of the pregnancy would to an extremely high degree
of probability cost the mother her life. A majority of the Court (Finlay
C.J., Hederman J. and Egan J.) also gave the opinion, in obiter dicta, that
Article 40(3)(3) required the courts, in proper cases and upon the
exercise of their discretion, to restrain by injunction the removal of the
"unborn" from the jurisdiction. Such restraint was required so that the
right to life of the "unborn" might be defended and vindicated, given
that the right to travel simpliciter did not take precedence over the right
to life.152 Although I cannot go into a more detailed analysis of the X
152 Following the November 1992 referendum, in the aftermath of the X case, these
subsections were added to Article 40(3)(3):
This section shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and another state.
This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State, subject
to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to services lawfully
available in another state.
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case judgment here, I will comment briefly on its significance as the last
chapter of the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law.
In the X case, we see the courts confronted with a problem of
their own making. When faced with the consequences of their
interpretation of Article 40(3)(3) on the life of a vulnerable, innocent
girl, a majority of the Supreme Court moved, finally, to contain the
"right to life of the unborn" by reference to the equal right to life of the
mother. Thus the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law came to
a close as it revealed itself by producing theX case. This last chapter
made the narrative comprehensible and thereby invited criticism of
"pro-life" fundamentalism as the narrative of Irish abortion law. The
reasoning of the High Court judge exposed the implications of the
fundamentalist narrative for women, and in so doing created the
conditions for the rejection of "pro-life" fundamentalism as the principle
around which Irish abortion law should organize. The overruled
judgment of Costello J. in the High Court, and the dissenting judgment
of Hederman J. in the Supreme Court, merit examination for their
illumination of the consequences for pregnant women of the absolutist
path established by the courts in Open Door, Coogan, and Grogan.
In granting the injunction which produced the X case crisis,
Costello J. said in the High Court: "[T]he risk that the defendant may
take her own life if an order is made is much less and is of a different
order and magnitude than the certainty that the life of the unborn will be
"terminated if the order is not made."15 3 In the Supreme Court,
Hederman J. referred to the fetus as "an autonomous human being" and
to the "mother's duty to carry out the pregnancy."15 4 He also expressed
the view that:
Suicide threats can be contained. The duration of the pregnancy is a matter of months
and it should not be impossible to guard the girl against self-destruction and preserve the
life of the unborn child at the same time. The choice is between the certain death of the
unborn life and a feared substantial danger of death but no degree of certainty of the
mother by way of self-destruction. 155
The lengths to which Hederman J. and Costello J. were prepared to go
in the name of protecting fetal life is shocking. They were casually
indifferent to women's lives as they claimed that nothing less than the
prospect of a pregnant woman's certain death could justify qualification
of the right to life of the "unborn." The health and welfare of women
See B. Girvin, "Moral Politics and the Irish Abortion Referedum, 1992" (1994) 47 Parl. Aff. 203.
153 X, supra note 2 at 12.
154 Ibid. at 72.
155 Ibid. at 76.
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were rendered insignificant concerns in the face of the imperative to
protect fetal life. For these judges, the physical, emotional, and mental
effects of this pregnancy on this woman were of little consequence, since
twenty-four-hour supervision would probably stop her from actually
killing herself. The idea that women's right to life might actually entitle
them to something other than enforced biological existence escaped
them. The fact that the woman's twenty-four-hour supervision over a
period of months amounts to her involuntary incarceration was also
deemed irrelevant. As Attracta Ingram has commented, on this
interpretation, Article 40(3)(3)'s assertion of equal rights for both
pregnant woman and fetus is a sham since "the right to life of the
mother is to physical survival while the right of the foetus is to all the
nurture it needs to develop into a fully participating member of the
community."156 When one considers what might have happened had
Hederman J.'s opinion found more support in the Supreme Court, the
actual decision in the X case-that there is a right to abortion where the
pregnancy poses a real and substantial risk to the life of the
woman---comes as a welcome relief. In rejecting the fundamentalist
representation of the value of fetal life, the Supreme Court and the Irish
public have opened up the terrain of Irish abortion law to the possibility
that other representations of the woman/fetus relationship might claim
legal authority.
Thus, the closure of the fundamentalist narrative of Irish
abortion law has created the opportunity for Irish feminism to move
beyond the negation of fundamentalism to the positive assertion of
women's reproductive freedom. The outrage that mobilized change in
the X case must extend beyond identifying with women whose
victimization is extreme, to identifying the wrong that is done to women
in denying them reproductive autonomy. The rejection of
fundamentalist absolutes is only one step, albeit an important one, in the
feminist struggle for the recognition of Irish women's right to
reproductive control. Other representations of the woman/fetus
relationship that construct women's interest in reproductive self-
determination as compromised by a public interest in fetal life must also
be refuted. "Pro-life" ideology will never be adequately refuted while
women have to endure pain and suffering in order that their entitlement
to reproductive autonomy be recognized. The notion that valuing fetal
life means subordinating women to pregnancy will continue to justify the
denial of access to abortion until women are acknowledged as the
156 "Home and Away: The Unequal Vista for Irish Women" in Smyth, ed., supra note 17, 149
at 154.
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mediators of the value ascribed to fetal life. The idea that fetal life must
be preserved will continue to function to deny women's equality until
women are recognized as having, in their own right, an entitlement to
control their reproductive capacities and their bodies. One of the tasks
that Irish feminism must take up in the struggle towards these goals is
the critique of the socio-legal relations with which it seeks to engage.
My effort to critique the process that led to the X case, by showing how it
might best be understood as part of a fundamentalist narrative, is a
contribution towards this struggle.
